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Abstract
In Chapter 1, I study how asset test elimination of Medicare Savings Programs affect
elderly seniors financial difficulty to access health care. In the United States, most
elderly seniors are covered by Medicare. However, the original Medicare could in-
cur non-negligible and uncapped out-of-pocket expenditure to the beneficiaries, which
could make health care still unaffordable. Medicare Savings Program (MSP) is a Med-
icaid program that help eligible Medicare beneficiaries to pay their Medicare share
cost. Asset test is often the major hurdle to block income eligible seniors to enroll in
MSP. Ten states have eliminated the asset test in MSP. I use difference in difference
approach to estimate that removing the asset test in MSP increased elderly seniors’
Medicaid coverage rate by 19 percent and reduce their financial difficulty to access
health care by 8 percent at extensive margin. Event study result shows that in average
it took 3 years for the effect to take off. States should consider removing the asset test
or make it less restrictive if doing so will make health care more accessible to elderly
seniors and reduce states’ administrative cost burden.
In Chapter 2, I study how Medicare eligibility at age 65 reduced people’s incentive
to get Medicaid divorce. To get a divorce, split the joint assets, and allocate most
of the assets to the healthy spouse is a strategy to help the sick spouse financially
qualify for Medicaid coverage. The exogenous age-based increase in eligibility for
Medicare and Medicaid reduces the incentive for people crossing the 65-threshold
to implement Medicaid divorce. Using regression discontinuity design, I estimate a
4.1 percent discrete decrease in the prevalence of divorce at the 65-threshold. By
examining how the magnitude of the divorce gap is associated with the state-level
iii
variation in Medicaid asset test, I argue that the divorce gap at age 65 measures the
reduction in Medicaid divorce. In addition, the heterogeneity analysis indicates that
the divorce gap is significantly larger for women, which suggests that Medicaid divorce
is more prevalent when the sick spouse is the wife.
In Chapter 3, I study the relationship between technological change and local labor
markets. Between 2000 and 2006, the U.S. economy was expanding and the housing
market exhibited prosperity. I examine the heterogeneous effect of the housing boom
and the Routine Biased Technological Change (RBTC) on the occupational composi-
tion of the U.S. labor market during this period. All 3-digit occupations are classified
into eight groups based on their task measures and education requirements. I find that
the local housing boom boosted the overall local employment level, while the effect of
RBTC was concentrated on low-skill occupations. Among the low-skill occupations
intensive in routine tasks, the local housing boom increased the local employment
share in office administrative support occupations, but had no significant effect on
production occupations. At the same time, the RBTC was shifting the low-skill labor
force away from these routine occupations to low-skill local service jobs. Moreover,
the production workers were losing jobs even when the economy was good, while
the employment share in local service occupations maintained strong even after the
housing bubble burst.
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Chapter 1
Evaluating the Impact of Asset Test Elimination in Medicare
Savings Program
1.1 Introduction
In the United States, elderly seniors age over 65 usually have Medicare health insurance coverage.
However, people who have original Medicare as the sole source of health insurance often face
non-negligible cost sharing. E.g. there is $1316 annual deductible in Medicare Part A (inpatient
hospital insurance), and Medicare Part A has zero coverage for hospital stays beyond the 150th
day. Also, Medicare Part B (outpatient medical insurance) has unlimited 20% co-insurance and
does not have catastrophic cap. Even though elderly seniors have higher insurance coverage rate
(near 100%) than the younger cohorts, they bear much higher out-of-pocket expenditure than the
younger cohorts as well (see Figure 1.1). As a consequence, in order to fill the cost sharing gap
of original Medicare, Medicare beneficiaries usually have to purchase additional health insurance
plans (Medigap supplemental plans, Medicare Advantage, etc) from the private market, or seek
help from public health insurance programs.
Medicare Savings Programs (MSP) are state Medicaid programs that help financially poor
Medicare beneficiaries to cover the Medicare out-of-pocket expenditure. Despite its name, MSP is
a means-tested Medicaid program. Like other Medicaid programs, it is jointly funded and managed
by both federal government and state government. People who are Medicare beneficiaries and also
have income and asset below certain limits are eligible to enroll.
The MSP income test and asset test vary across states. In most states, the income limit is
1
100% FPL (Federal Poverty Line), and the asset limit is $7280 for individuals and $10930 for
couples (in 2015). Asset test is often considered the major barrier to block the income eligible
Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in MSP. When people reach their retirement age, it is often the
case that they will have low income flow, but have saved some money in retirement account.
Compared to the income test, the asset test is more binding for elderly seniors. Researchers have
been calling for removing the MSP asset test entirely. Figure 1.2 plots the density of out-of-pocket
(OOP) expenditure between two cohorts: (1) Elderly seniors with income below 100% FPL but not
covered by Medicaid; (2) Elderly seniors with income above 100% FPL and covered by Medicaid.
Clearly, cohort (1) face a more right skewed OOP expenditure distribution. The median annual
OOP expenditure of cohort (1) is almost 4 times as that of cohort (2). Asset test might be one of
the reasons which blocks some of the people to switch from cohort (1) to cohort (2).
On the other hand, asset test can incur cost burden to state Medicaid agency, too. To throughly
examine each applicants’ asset level requires considerable labor effort. Also, states might want
to make the eligibility rules in align for different but similar public health insurance programs, so
that it is easier to manage and less confusing. Because of various consideration, ten states have
removed their MSP asset test.
This paper studies the impact of eliminating MSP asset test. We exploit the state variation of
the timing of the asset test removal, and adopt difference-in-difference, event study, and synthetic
control methods. We find that states that removed the MSP asset test increased their seniors’
Medicaid enrollment by 19 percent, and reduced seniors’ financial difficulty to access health care
by 8 percent at extensive margin.
After January 2014, in states that have adopted ACA Medicaid expansion, Medicaid asset test
is completely canceled for non-elderly adults (age≤ 64). Besides, the federal asset limit is raised to
%138 FPL. Non-elderly adults in these states will find the barrier to qualify for Medicaid is lower
than ever before. At the same time, the Medicaid eligibility for elderly seniors did not change. In
most states, the MSP income limit is still %100 FPL and the asset test still exits. As a consequence,
a 64-year-old Medicaid beneficiary in certain states might find that he/she will lose Medicaid once
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he/she crosses the age 65 threshold. States should consider relax the financial eligibility of MSP
so that the nearly elderly cohorts (age between 60 and 64) did not face coverage reduction and
welfare loss when they make the Medicare transition at 65. In fact, asset test elimination in MSP
is similar to ACA Medicaid expansion (see Table 1.1).
This is the first paper in the literature to study the impact of asset test elimination in Medicare
Savings Programs. Substantial previous literature study ACA Medicaid expansion, which is for
non-elderly adults. I show that Medicaid expansion for elderly seniors also have important impli-
cation in improving seniors’ welfare. And policy makers of public insurance programs can pay
more attention to the elderly population. The remaining sections of this paper are structured as
follows: Section 2 provides more comprehensive details of the institutional backgrounds. Section
3 introduces the data this paper uses. Section 4 introduces the empirical approach and econometric
methodology. Section 5 shows the empirical results. Section 6 discusses special cases. Section 7
concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Original Medicare
Medicare is a universal federal social insurance program. Medicare is closely related to Social
Security program. People who have paid Medicare taxes for at least 10 years when they were
working, are automatically eligible for Medicare Part A (inpatient hospital insurance) without
paying premium when they turn into 65 years old. Eligible seniors can also choose to purchase
Part B (outpatient medical care), which charges $134 monthly premium. Part A and Part B are
called original Medicare.
The cost sharing of original Medicare is infamously expensive and uncapped. In Medicare Part
A, there is $1316 annual deductible for the first 60 days of hospital stays. No coverage is provided
before the deductible is met. The co-pay is $332 per day for day 61-90, and $658 per day for
day 91-150. If the Medicaid beneficiary still needs hospital care beyond day 150, no coverage is
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provided. Part A can also cover skilled nursing home care. There are no deductible and co-pay
for the first 20 days of skilled nursing care. But it incurs $164.5 co-pay per day for day 21-100.
Also, Part B does not cover nursing home care beyond day 100. As for Part B, after $134 annual
deductible is met, there is %20 co-insurance for each Medical care. The co-insurance share is fixed
and uncapped.
As indicated in Figure 1.1, although elderly senior cohorts have almost 100% universal health
insurance coverage rate because of Medicare, their annual out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure is
nearly four times as large as those of the younger cohorts. In order to fill the cost-sharing hole,
elderly seniors can purchase additional Medigap supplemental insurance, which provides a broader
range of coverage and lower cost sharing. Alternatively, Medicaid is another option if the senior is
eligible.
1.2.2 Medicaid and Medicare Savings Programs
Elderly seniors who are financially poor can also qualify for Medicaid. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid
consists of many means-tested programs. Medicaid is jointly funded by federal government and
state government, and mainly managed by states. Thus the eligibility rules and coverage details
hugely vary across states. In summary, Medicaid provides more comprehensive coverage than
Medicare, such as dental care, vision care, nursing home care, etc. More importantly, Medicaid
can usually help Medicare beneficiaries pay the Medicare out-of-pocket expenditure.
In general, there are three major channels for elderly seniors to enroll in Medicaid program:
(1) SSI (Supplemental Security Income) recipients can automatically qualify for Medicaid; (2)
(Medically needy) Those who need health care in particular months and those whose income will
fall below certain limits after deducting the health care expenses from the income; (3) Medicare
beneficiaries can enroll in Medicaid through a Medicare Savings Program. Table 1.2 shows the
financial eligibility for all these three channels. Among these three channels, Medicare Savings
Program (e.g. QMB (Qualified Medicare Beneficiary program)) has the most generous income
limit and asset limit. Prior to 2010, the federal asset limit is $4000/$6000 for Medicare Savings
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Program, twice as high as the federal asset limit of the other two channels. Since 2010, the MSP
asset limit started to be adjusted to inflation, which further enlarge the gap. For example, the MSP
asset limit was $7280/$10930, while the asset limit remained to be $2000/$3000 for the other
two channels. Therefore, Medicare Savings Program is the most accessible channel to enroll in
Medicaid for elderly seniors.
Medicare Savings Program is also called “partial Medicaid package", because it only covers
Medicare share costs. Unlike full Medicaid, which people have to enroll through the other two
channels, Medicare Savings Program does not cover additional health care service that are not
covered by Medicare.
There are three different Medicare Savings Programs targeted to elderly seniors: QMB (Qual-
ified Medicare Beneficiary program), SLMB (Specified Low-income Medicare Beneficiar pro-
gram), and QI (Qualified Individual program). QMB has the most generous coverage: premiums,
deductibles, coninsurance, and co-payments of both Medicare Part A and Part B. On the other
hand, SLMB and QI only covers Part B premiums. As of eligibility, all three programs have the
same federal asset limit, but SLMB and QI have slightly higher income limit. In this paper, we
will put our emphasis on the asset test elimination of QMB program.
1.2.3 Asset Test Elimination
About thirty years ago, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA) first introduced the con-
cept of Medicare Savings Program and gave states the option to establish their MSP. The Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 made the option mandatory. Since 1989, all states have their
own QMB program. Since then, the federal asset limit had remained to be $4000/$6000 and had
not changed for nearly 20 years. Because of inflation, the real value of the asset limit actually has
been decreasing, which means the asset test was becoming more and more restrictive and binding.
In 2010, because of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) of 2008
made the MSP asset limit in align with the asset limit of the Medicare Part D Low Income Subsidy
(LIS) program. This act increased the MSP asset limit to $6600/$9910.
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Throughout the time, ten states have also completely eliminated asset test in their Medicare
Savings Programs. In July 1998, Alabama became the first state to remove asset test. After that,
Mississippi, Delaware, Arizona, Vermont, Maine, New York, DC, and Connecticut removed the
asset test in different timing. Oregon is the last state that have eliminated the asset test so far –
They removed the asset test in January 2016.
Eight years after Maine removed asset test, the state government decided to introduce asset test
again for their Medicare Savings Program, although their new asset limit is much higher than the
federal level ($50000/$70000, liquid asset only). Besides, although Minnesota haven’t removed
asset test, they increased the asset limit to $10000/$18000 in 2001 and maintained in a higher level
than the federal asset limit.
We will study how MSP asset test elimination affected Medicaid enrollment, and whether it
reduced elderly seniors’ financial difficulty to access health care.
1.3 Data
We draw Medicaid coverage data from Current Population Survey (CPS). CPS is a public available
data set that contains state identifier and health insurance information of the individuals. It also
contains rich individuals’ demographic characteristics such as age. In our analysis, we will restrict
the sample to individuals older than 65 (65 included).
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) is an annual health related phone inter-
view survey. In the survey, each interviewee was asked "Was there a time in the past 12 months
when you needed to see a doctor but could not because of cost?" The variable MEDCOST equals
1 if the interviewee answered "Yes" for the above question, MEDCOST equals 0 if the answer was
"No". MEDCOST measures people’s subjective perception of whether they had financial difficulty
to access health care in the given period. BRFSS also includes state identifier, which is suitable for
our analysis.
Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 plots the treatment status in state-year panel cells. BRFSS data are
more incomplete and noisier than CPS data. In certain state-year cells, the MEDCOST questions
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were not asked at all, thus we will have missing values in these cells. Specifically, the MEDCOST
variable is systematically missing in 2001, so we will drop year 2001 in our regression analysis.
1.4 Econometric Method
1.4.1 Difference in Difference
First, we use a difference in difference model to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of
asset test elimination, and conduct inference about the statistical uncertainty about the parameter
estimate. The DID model setup is as follows:
Yist = αs +θt +δDst +Xiβ + εist
Yist is the outcome variable (Medicaid coverage or MEDCOST) for individual i in state s in year
t. Dst is the treatment variable in the state-year cell level: Dst = 1 if MSP asset test is already
eliminated in state s in year t; Dst = 0 if (1) state s is a control group state, or (2) t is a pre-
treatment year for a treated group state s. I include dummies αs to capture state fixed effect and
dummies θt to capture year fixed effect. Xi are a vector of individual level covariates. δ is the DID
parameter of interest.
1.4.2 Event Study
Since we have a long panel data including over 20 years, and there exists variation in the exact
treatment time across different treated group states, we adopt a event study model. In the event
study model, we can visualize the dynamic treatment effect by years after the treatment. Also we
can visualize the pre-trend of the outcome variable in the years just prior to the treatment. The
event study model setup is as follows:
Yist = αs +θt +
10
∑
τ=−5
δτ ·1(EventTimest = τ)+ εist
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Yist is the outcome variable (Medicaid coverage or MEDCOST) for individual i in state s in year
t. I include dummies αs to capture state fixed effect and dummies θt to capture year fixed effect.
EventTimest measures number of years after or prior to the asset test elimination for state s in year
t. δτ is the parameter of interest, which captures the difference in the outcome variable τ years
relative to the baseline level (the last pre-treatment yaer). Then we can plot the estimated δ̂τ along
with their confidence interval as a time series.
1.5 Results
Table 1.5 shows that removing MSP asset test significantly increased Medicaid coverage rate for
elderly seniors by 2.19 percentage points in the treated states. Compared to the baseline level 11.5
percentage points (the average Medicaid coverage rate in treated states in pre-treatment period),
it accounts for 19 percent increase, which is economically significant, too. After controlling indi-
vidual covariates, the magnitude of the point estimate is lowered by a little bit to 1.76 percentage
points, but is still significant.
Besides, removing asset test significantly reduced MEDCOST issues by 0.43 percentage points
(8 percent relative reduction). Since MEDCOST is a "yes or no" binary variable, we can claim that
the reduction is at the extensive margin.
Figure 1.6 plots the event study coefficients and their confidence intervals on the Medicaid
coverage rate regression. Three years after the asset test elimination, the Medicaid coverage rate
started to increase to a much higher level. Figure 1.7 plots the event study coefficients for MED-
COST. The MEDCOST issues started to significantly decreased also three years after the asset test
elimination, which matches the previous findings in Medicaid coverage rate.
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1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Bring back the Asset Test
Maine is the only state that brought the asset test back after removing it. We are interested to see
if bringing back the asset test would offset the previous effect of increasing Medicaid coverage
rate and reducing financial difficulty to access health care. So we will look at Maine as a special
case study. In the previous DID model, we set Dst = 1 for Maine between 2006 and 2013, and
set Dst = 0 for Maine after 2014. Now we set Dst always equals 1 for Maine after 2006, but add
an interaction term Dst ·1(s = Maine) · (t ≥ 2014). The new difference-in-difference-in-difference
(DDD) type model is as follows:
Yist = αs +θt +δ1Dst +δ2Dst ·1(s = Maine) · (t ≥ 2014)+ εist
δ2 is the DDD parameter. It captures the effect of Maine bring back asset test in 2014. Table 1.6
shows that δ̂2 is estimated -4.94 percentage points for Medicaid coverage, which implies adding
the asset test potentially reduced the Medicaid coverage rate by 4.94 percentage points. Relative
to the baseline level for Maine in 2013 (17.68 percentage points), it accounts for a 28 percent
decrease. On the other hand, the DDD estimate for MEDCOST is insignificant.
The new MSP asset limit in Maine is $50000/$70000 liquid asset, which is much higher than
the federal level. A possible explanation for the above estimates is that the new asset test only
ruled out those MSP enrollees who could have afford health care by themselves if not covered by
MSP.
1.6.2 Increase the Asset Limit in Control States
In 2010, the federal MSP asset limit was raised from $4000/$6000 to $6600/$9910 and became
inflation adjusted thereafter. The increase of federal asset limit would shrink the gap between the
control states and treated states. We are interested to see if the closing gap also alleviated the
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impact of asset test elimination. We set up a new DDD model:
Yist = αs +θt +δ1Dst · (t < 2010)+δ2Dst · (t ≥ 2010)+ εist
Here we split the post-treatment period into two subperiods to estimate: (1) The treatment effect in
the pre-2010 period; and (2) The treatment effect in the post-2010 period. δ1 and δ2 capture these
two effects.
Table 1.7 reports the result. The average treatment effect on Medicaid coverage rate in all
post-treatment periods is 2.19 percentage points. The treatment effect in pre-2010 period is 2.40
percentage points, and the treatment effect in post-2010 period is 2.10 percentage points. Both of
them are significant, but the point estimate is larger in pre-2010 period than in post-2010 period.
On the other hand, asset test elimination reduced the MEDCOST issues by 1.05 percentage
points in pre-2010 period, which is of a much larger magnitude than the average effect over all
time (-0.43 percentage points). However, after 2010, there is no significant difference between the
treated states and control states.
1.7 Conclusion
In summary, removing asset test in Medicare Savings Program increase the elderly seniors’ Med-
icaid coverage rate by 19 percent and reduced elderly seniors’ financial difficulty to access health
care by 8 percent. If asset test also bears administrative cost burden to those states still keep the
asset test, then those states should consider removing the asset test as well.
Connecticut, a state that has removed MSP asset test, faced a budget problem in Medicaid
expenditure and was discussing to introduce asset test back to the MSP. But eventually this proposal
did not pass in the state legislature. Back into 2014, Maine proposed to cut the Medicaid budget for
young adults (19-20 years old) and elderly seniors. Congress rejected the proposal to cut budget
for young adults but approved to proposal for elderly seniors. That’s why Maine introduced asset
test back for MSP. We should pay more attention to seniors’ welfare as well.
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Figure 1.1: Insurance Coverage Rate and Median Annual Out-of-pocket Expenditure by Age Co-
hort
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Figure 1.2: Density of Out-of-pocket Expenditure
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Figure 1.3: MSP Asset Limit
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Figure 1.4: State-year Panel of Treatment Status in CPS data
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Figure 1.5: State-year Panel of Treatment Status in BRFSS data
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Figure 1.6: Event Study Result of Medicaid Coverage Rate
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Figure 1.7: Event Study Result of MEDCOST
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Table 1.1: Comparison between ACA Medicaid Expansion and MSP Asset Test Elimination
2014 ACA Medicaid expansion MSP asset test elimination
Age cohort Non-elderly (≤65) Elderly seniors (≥65)
Range of expansion Expanded eligibility groups; Removed asset test
Increased income limit;
Removed asset test
Timeline 2014 - current 1998 - current
# adopted states 34 10
Led by federal act? Yes No
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Table 1.2: Medicaid Eligibility for Seniors
SSI Medically Needy1 QMB
Income limit (%FPL)
Federal 73% NA 100%
State 52% - 100% 10% - 110% 100% - 300%
Asset limit
Federal $2000/$3000 $2000/$3000 $4000/$60002
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation. 2015 income limit data for MN and QMB; 2017 data for SSI.
1. As of 2015, 33 states have Medically Needy program.
2. Adapted to higher asset limit in line with Medicare Part D LIS program after 2010. In 2015 it is $7280/$10930.
19
Table 1.3: State Variation of QMB Asset Test Elimination Time
State Time removed
Alabama 1998 July
Mississippi 1999 July
Delaware 2000 May
Arizona1 2001 October
Vermont 2006 January
Maine2 2006 March
New York 2008 April
DC 2008 November
Connecticut 2009 October
Oregon 2016 January
1 Arizona also removed asset test for full Medicaid at the same time
2 Maine introduced back a $50000/$70000 liquid asset limit in January 2014
* Minnesota did not eliminate asset test but have increased the asset limit to $10000/$18000 since 2001 (federal limit was $4000/$6000).
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Table 1.4: Eligibility and Coverage of Medicare Savings Programs
Qualified Medicare Beneficiary Specified Low-income Qualified Individual
Medicare Beneficiary
QMB SLMB QI
Coverage Part A & B premiums, Part B premiums Part B premiums
deductibles, coninsurance, co-payments
Federal income limit (%FPL) 100% 120% 135%
Federal asset limit1 $4000/$6000 $4000/$6000 $4000/$6000
Annual limited quota No No Yes
1. Adapted to higher asset limit in line with Medicare Part D LIS program after 2010.
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Table 1.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Dependent variable: Medicaid coverage MEDCOST
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post_Treatment 2.19∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.11)
Baseline level 11.50 11.50 5.22 5.22
Year FE x x x x
State FE x x x x
Clustered SE x x x x
Controls x x
Observations 521204 521204 1921164 1921164
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The estimates are based on pooled 1991-2016 CPS and BRFSS data. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
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Table 1.6: DDD Estimates, Effect of Maine Bringing Back Asset Test
Dependent variable: Medicaid coverage MEDCOST
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline level (pre-elimination) 11.50 11.50 5.22 5.22
δ1 2.15∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21)
Baseline level (Maine 2013) 17.68 2.44
δ2 −4.94∗∗∗ −0.24
(1.23) (0.19)
Year FE x x x x
State FE x x x x
Clustered SE x x x x
Specification DDD DD DDD DD
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The estimates are based on pooled 1991-2016 CPS and BRFSS data. Clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
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Table 1.7: DDD Estimates, Pre-2010 Effects and Post-2010 Effects
Dependent variable: Medicaid coverage MEDCOST
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ (average effect) 2.19∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗
(0.25) (0.21)
δ1 (pre 2010) 2.40∗∗∗ −1.05∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.25)
δ2 (post 2010) 2.10∗∗∗ −0.17
(0.27) (0.24)
Year FE x x x x
State FE x x x x
Clustered SE x x x x
Specification DDD DD DDD DD
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The estimates are based on pooled 1991-2016 CPS and BRFSS data. Clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
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Chapter 2
Does Age-Based Public Health Insurance Eligibility Save
Medicaid Divorce? Regression Discontinuity Evidence at Age
65
2.1 Introduction
Consider a couple at their late 50s or early 60s. If one of the spouse suddenly gets chronically
sick and needs expensive medical treatments, then the couple have to face large medical bills and
increasing health insurance premium. In order to prevent the couple from spending down their
retirement savings to the medical bills, they might be advised by their lawyer to implement a
Medicaid divorce.1 After divorce and allocating most of their joint assets to the healthy spouse,
the sick spouse then becomes financially poor enough to qualify for Medicaid coverage. Then the
sick spouse’s medical use will be paid by Medicaid. Many elder law professionals think Medicaid
divorce is a strategic option to avoid the increasing medical expenditures accompanied by aging.2
However, if the sick spouse is over 65 years old, then Medicaid divorce is less necessary.
First, seniors aged over 65 are under the cover of Medicare. Medicare is the largest public health
insurance program in the United States. People automatically become eligible for Medicare when
they cross the 65-threshold. According to their needs, people can choose to enroll in a combination
of affordable health insurance plans within the Medicare systems. Medicare does not charge higher
premium or even decline coverage based on health conditions.
1Michael L. Olver and Christopher C. Lee, “Medicaid Divorce: An Overview." Helsell Fetterman, December 13,
2010
2Amy Ziettlow, “Is Divorce the Best Option for Older Americans?" Huffington Post, May 16, 2015
25
Second, “seniors aged over 65" by itself is a Medicaid eligibility category. The financial re-
striction for Medicaid qualification is more lenient for seniors than for many of the categories of
people aged below 65. In many states, the asset limit and income limit are set higher for seniors. As
a consequence, after crossing the 65-threshold, it is easier for the sick spouse to show financially
poor and meet the Medicaid financial eligibility, even without divorce and asset splitting.
These increases in public health insurance eligibility at age 65 is systematic, exogenous, and
purely age based. I hypothesize that the incentive for Medicaid divorce will also systematically
decrease at age 65 because of the increasing eligibility. To examine my hypothesis, I use regression
discontinuity design with pooled 2008-2015 American Community Survey (ACS) data. Assuming
age as an assignment variable, I find a divorce gap at the 65-threshold: Divorce rate (the prevalence
of divorce) discretely jump down by 0.7 percentage points at age 65, which accounts for a 4.1
percent decrease.
In the literature, many papers exploit the age-based and birth-date-based variation in health
insurance eligibility and use regression discontinuity design the study the impact of health insur-
ance coverage. Among many of the papers, Card, Dobkin and Maestas (2008), Card, Dobkin and
Maestas (2009) are the most related to my research. They investigate the impact of the universal
coverage of Medicare at 65-threshold on medical utilization and mortality. But they do not take
into consideration that the eligibility for Medicaid also increases at the 65-threshold. Anderson,
Dobkin and Gross (2012) find that the young adults crossing the 19-threshold “age out" of their
parents’ insurance plans, which leads to reduction in ED visits and inpatient hospital admissions.
More broadly, Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) exploit the minimum drinking age threshold at 21 and
find legal access to alcohol increased alcohol related death among young adults.
To my best knowledge, my paper is the first to use regression discontinuity design to exploit
the age based eligibility for health insurance and study its impact on divorce behavior and family
structure. Chen (2017) uses difference-in-difference design and finds that Medicare unlocks the
“marriage lock" of the spousal dependent employer-based health insurance. Literature on Medicaid
divorce is also rare. Slusky and Ginther (2017) provide quasi-experimental evidence to show that
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the ACA Medicaid expansion reduced the divorce rate by 5.6 percent in expanded states among
50-64 cohorts.
To accurately measure the quantity of Medicaid divorce is difficult, since people usually do not
reveal their true motivation of divorce. It remains to be an open question in the literature. This
paper and Slusky and Ginther (2017) try to estimate the change in divorce prevalence due to the
exogenous change in public health insurance coverage, under different contexts. I argue that I at
least partly capture the “lower bound" of the quantity of Medicaid divorce.
The main purpose of Medicaid divorce is to make the sick spouse to pass the asset test. To
validate my argument that the divorce gap at age 65 is the reduction in Medicaid divorce, I further
exploit other sources of exogenous state-level variation in asset tests. First, each state has its
own Medicare savings programs. Medicare savings program is partial Medicaid benefit package
which help financially poor seniors aged over 65 to cover the out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure of
Medicare. In eight states 3, there are no asset tests for these programs. The incentive for post-
65 Medicaid divorce should be further reduced in these eight states. I compare the divorce gap
in the states that do not impose asset tests for Medicare savings programs with those states do
impose, and I do find statistically larger divorce gap in no-test states (1.1 percentage points v.s. 0.5
percentage points). To my best knowledge, my paper is the first in economics literature to study
the state-level variation in Medicare savings programs.
Second, 2014 ACA Medicaid expansion reduced the incentive for people aged below 65 to
implement Medicaid divorce. This will “close down" the divorce gap. I do find the divorce dis-
continuity estimate in expanded states after 2014 to be statistically insignificant. The empirical
evidence that the magnitude of the age-based divorce gap is associated with the state-level asset
tests supports my hypothesis.
Different subgroups might have different degree of willingness to implement Medicaid divorce.
This can be reflected in the heterogeneous magnitude of the divorce gap at age 65. My subgroup
heterogeneity analysis indicates that the divorce gap is more significant and larger for women
3Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Mississippi, New York, and Vermont
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(0.9 percentage points) and African Americans (1.4 percentage points). There are no statistically
significant difference between noncollege population and people with a college degree.
Karraker and Latham (2015) uses Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data to study the rela-
tion between spouse’s physical illness and the subsequent divorce behavior of the couple. Their
descriptive analysis shows that wife’s illness onset are associated with elevated risk of divorce,
while there is no such association between husband’s illness and divorce. My finding on the larger
divorce gap for women and insignificant divorce gap for men provides indirect explanation to this
phenomenon: Medicaid divorce is more prevalent when the wife gets sick.
The remaining parts of this paper are structured as follows: Section 2 elaborates the institutional
background of Medicaid divorce and age based increased eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid.
Section 3 elaborates my regression discontinuity design and details on econometric methods. Sec-
tion 4 briefly introduces data. Main empirical results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2.2 Backgrounds
2.2.1 Medicaid Divorce
Medicaid is a public health insurance program jointly administered and funded by both federal gov-
ernment and states government. The federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
monitors the state-run programs and sets up general requirements for service delivery, quality,
funding, and eligibility standards. The primary goal of Medicaid is to secure the right of individu-
als with limited resources to obtain medically necessary health care. It was introduced in 1965 and
majorly reformed recently in 2014 under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Individuals who have fi-
nancial difficulties and fall in certain categories are eligible for Medicaid coverage. The categories
include children, pregnant women, parents, disable individuals, individuals receiving Supplemen-
tal Security Income, elderly senior aged over 65, medically needy individuals, and individuals who
need long-term care, etc. The precise covered categories and financial eligibility slightly vary from
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states to states. States have the option to expand the qualified categories. Medicaid covers the
recipients’ most of the spending on qualifying medical care, like doctor visits and hospital costs,
long-term care services in nursing homes, and long-term care services provided at home, such as
visiting nurses and assistance with personal care.
Each state sets up its own income test and asset test for Medicaid financial eligibility. Categor-
ically qualifying individuals have to prove they are in financial difficulties by meeting the limit.
When it comes to financial eligibility, married couple is counted as a unit, so income and asset
jointly held by a couple are taken into consideration. There are special rule for couples to meet
these tests.
Some states apply the same income requirement for Medicaid as for Social Security Disability
(SSD) benefits. In these states SSD benefit recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid. In
other states, the income requirement is more restrictive. Most states set up the income limit as a
certain percentage of Federal Poverty Line (FPL). In most states, the asset limit is $2000 for an
individual and $3000 for a couple. Assets that fall into certain categories are exempted, such as
principal residence home, one motor vehicle, clothing, furniture, jewelry, prepaid funeral plans,
and life insurance, etc. All non-exempted, excess assets of the couple are required to be spent
down in order to obtain Medicaid eligibility for either spouse, regardless of whether the asset is
registered under the healthy spouse’s name or under the sick spouse’s name. Therefore, transfer
from the sick spouse to the healthy spouse does not work.
Technically, the couple can transfer the excess assets to their children, siblings, parents and
relatives so that the excess assets will be ruled out from their account. Then they can fall below the
asset limit. However, state will look at all transfers made within five years before the applicant ap-
plies for Medicaid. A penalty period when the individuals are temporarily ineligible for Medicaid
is determined if suspicious transfers are detected during the five-year look back period. The length
of the penalty period depends on the precise amount of the assets being transferred. Therefore,
asset transfer might not be the optimal strategy for those whose wealth is far above the limit and
have urgent need for Medicaid coverage.
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Instead, couples in such situations might be advised by their lawyer and financial planner to
implement a divorce. Divorce is a legal way to separate assets between the sick spouse and the
healthy spouse. After divorce and allocating most of the assets to the healthy spouse, the sick
spouse will be counted as an individual and will have assets below the limit when applying for
Medicaid. Such asset separation due to divorce is not subject to the penalty period. At a practical
standpoint, such Medicaid divorce can be viewed as a welfare optimization and strategic response
to the eligibility policy, rather than end of love, commitment and responsibility.
To implement Medicaid divorce in a legal, efficient manner requires professional expert and
specialized knowledge in various areas. A successful Medicaid divorce often relies on the joint
effort by an elder law attorney, an estate planner, and a divorce lawyer, etc.
To empirically measure the magnitude of Medicaid divorce is one of the objectives of this
paper. In fact, being divorced is positively correlated with having Medicaid. I plot the correlation
coefficients between being divorced and being covered by Medicaid among age cohorts in Figure
2.1. We can see a clearly invert U-shape structure. Before 65, the correlation between divorce and
being covered by Medicaid is increasing as age increases. The upward trend starts to get steeper
since about 50-year-old cohort, and the correlation reaches the peak at 64-cohort. At 65-year-old
cohort, the correlation discontinuously drops, then starts to go down. Of course, there might be
common confounding factors which affect both divorce status and Medicaid eligibility, so part of
the correlation might be spurious. But it still offers suggestive evidence to a possible explanation:
as people aging, there is an increasing trend for individuals to implement Medicaid divorce in
order to get Medicaid coverage. That’s why we see stronger and stronger correlation. But after 65,
suddenly people don’t need Medicaid divorce any more. So the correlation starts to decline. At a
preview of Figure 2.2, we can see a similar picture: The divorce rate also discontinuously drops at
65, then gradually goes down.
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2.2.2 Medicare
Medicare, administered solely by federal government, is an age-based public health insurance
program. Elderly seniors aged over 65 are automatically eligible for Medicare coverage. Unlike
Medicaid, there is no big difference in many of the institutional settings of Medicare across states.
Medicare coverage is divided into many parts. Some of them are free, and some of them charge
premium and are optional. Elderly seniors who (whose spouse) have been working and paying
Medicare taxes for at least 10 years are covered by Medicare Part A without paying premium.
Medicare Part A covers inpatient hospital care, skilled nursing facility care, and hospice care.
Medicare Part B covers preventive service, clinical research, ambulance service, durable medical
equipment (DME), mental health, etc, most of which are in outpatient basis. Typically, people have
to pay for Part B. The standard premium in 2017 is $134 per month. Part A and Part B together
are usually called “Original Medicare". Both Part A and Part B provide standardized, uniform
coverage to each Medicare beneficiaries.
Medicare beneficiaries can also optionally purchase Part D. Part D mostly covers prescription
drugs. Unlike Original Medicare, Part D is not standardized. People can choose one of the Part
D drug plans depending on their needs. Each drug plan has its own list of covered drugs. The
monthly premium also differ among drug plans.
Compared with Medicaid, Medicare is less generous. In fact, the share cost of Medicare is
high. For example, in 2017, there is $1316 deductible for a hospital stay of days 1-60. The co-
pay for days 61-90 is $322 per day and the co-pay for days 91-150 is $658 per day. There is no
deductible and co-pay for the first 20 days of skilled nursing care. But the co-pay is $164.5 per day
for days 21-100. The yearly deductible for Medicare Part B is $183. After the deductible is met,
people still need to pay 20% co-insurance.
Original Medicare does not include out-of-pocket (OOP) limit. It does not cover nursing home
care and custodial care if they are the only medical service needed. For those elderly seniors in
great demand for long-term daily care, the coverage of Original Medicare is very limited. Original
Medicare beneficiaries still face the stress of high OOP expenditure.
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Original Medicare beneficiaries can also optionally purchase Medicare Supplement Insurance
(usually called Medigap). Medigap supplements Original Medicare, and pays for the share cost
of Original Medicare such as deductibles, co-payment, and co-insurance. Medigap policies are
sold by private companies, but they are strictly regulated by federal and states. Companies are
prohibited to make extra charge or decline coverage based on client’s medical answers, and are
prohibited to decline renewing the policy due to health issues. All Medigap policies offer basic
standardized benefits, and some provide additional benefits. The main purpose of Medigap is to
help beneficiaries to fill in the financial holes of Original Medicare. Some Medigap policies cover
all Original Medicare OOP expenditure and provide complete financial security.
Alternatively, Original Medicare beneficiaries can choose to switch and enroll in Medicare
Advantage Plan (sometimes called Part C, but it is somewhat misleading since Medicare Advantage
Plan and Original Medicare operate in different systems). Medicare Advantage Plan basically
covers what is covered by Original Medicare. But people can pay extra premium to obtain extra
content, such as out-of-pocket expenditure limit, dental care, vision care, annual physicals, etc.
The precise amount of premium differs among plans. The OOP limit is especially useful for those
elderly seniors in great demand for regular medical service and treatments. Through the system of
Medicare Advantage Plan, beneficiaries must go to only a select network of health care providers.
During 2008-2015, 95.13% of the elderly seniors aged between 65 and 75 receive Medicare.
The Medicare coverage rate jumps from only 16.77% for the 64-cohort, to as large as 86.09% for
the 65-cohort (based on author’s own calculation from ACS data). Medicare does not discriminate
pre-existing conditions. To some extent, the Original Medicare is an affordable health insurance
plan charges uniform premium on all beneficiaries (Premium differs slightly depending on bene-
ficiary’s income status). Therefore, Medicare partly substitutes Medicaid and other private health
insurance at age 65. But Original Medicare alone is far from a perfect substitute for Medicaid due
to its limited coverage and lack of out-of-pocket expenditure limit. However, the problem of no
OOP limit can be mitigated by purchasing Medigap policies or enrolling in Medicare Advantage
Plan, at the expense of paying extra but probably still affordable premium.
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2.2.3 Dual Eligibility and Medicare Savings Program
After an individual reaches 65, he/she would almost certainly be eligible for Medicare. But the
likelihood of obtaining some Medicaid coverage also increases. That is because: First, “elderly
seniors aged over 65" by itself is one of the Medicaid recipient categories. Second, the Medi-
caid eligibility financial limit for elderly seniors is somewhat more lenient than for those who are
aged below 65, depending on states. Third, even an elderly senior is financially non-eligible for
Medicaid full benefits, he/she might still qualify for a partial Medicaid benefit package.
Those who are eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid are often referred to “dual-eligible"
beneficiaries. Dual-eligible beneficiaries receive either Medicaid full benefit package or Medicaid
partial benefit package. Full benefit recipients receive the entire range of Medicaid benefits, in-
cluding those health care service not covered by the Original Medicare such as long-term nursing
home care and personal custodial care. Dual eligibility helps fill in the financial holes of Medicare,
as the OOP expenditure of the Original Medicare is infamously uncapped. If a certain category
of health care service is in the Medicare-Medicaid-dual-covered list, Medicare will pay for the
medical bill first, then Medicaid will cover the remaining OOP cost left by Medicare.
Elderly seniors older than 65 who cannot qualify for Medicaid full benefit might still have a
chance to enroll in one of the Medicare Savings Programs. Medicare Savings Programs include
Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) Program, Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiary
(SLMB) Program, Qualifying Individual (QI) Program, and Qualified Disabled and Working In-
dividuals (QDWI) Program. Regardless of the name, the benefits of Medicare Savings Programs
is actually drawn from Medicaid. So there is slight difference across states in financial eligibility
rules and precise benefits. But the difference is somewhat smaller than the difference in normal
Medicaid. In general, these Medicare Savings Programs help enrollees pay for their Medicare
Part A premium, Part B premium, deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance. The income and
asset limit of these programs are set more lenient than the limit for the Medicaid full benefit pack-
age. For example, the QI Program covers individuals whose household income up to 135% FPL.
More importantly, in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Mississippi, New York, and
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Vermont, there are no asset limits for participating in these programs.
The relaxation of Medicaid eligibility requirement at age 65 helps fill in the financial holes of
Medicare and reimburse the expenditure on medical bills. Based on author’s own calculation with
ACS data, the share of individuals having Medicaid coverage is 12.13% among 65-cohort during
2008-2015. The combination of Medicare and Medicaid makes elderly seniors less necessary to
implement Medicaid divorce. In those states where no asset test is imposed for Medicare Savings
Program, the incentive for post-65 Medicaid divorce is further reduced.
2.2.4 Affordable Care Act and Medicaid Expansion
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law in 2010. Many of the
policies became effective since 2014. The federal and state government established health insur-
ance exchange, a large online open health insurance marketplace. According to the premium and
out-of-pocket spending requirement, the health insurance plans sold in the exchange are catego-
rized into four tiers: bronze, silver, gold, and platinum. All tires of the plans offer the essential
health benefits. Within each tier, the premium must be determined solely on the basis of age
and residence location. Insurance companies in the exchange are prohibited to decline coverage
or charge extra premium due to pre-existing conditions. The maximum premium the insurance
companies are allowed to charge the oldest age group cannot exceed three times of the premium
charged on the youngest age group. What’s more, each health insurance plan must contain maxi-
mum out-of-pocket (MOOP) payment cap. Once the annual MOOP cap is reached, the insurance
company must pay the remaining costs.
In addition to the reform of health insurance market, ACA also expanded Medicaid. The deci-
sion of whether joining the Medicaid expansion was left to states. Federal government is respon-
sible for most of the Medicaid funding in those expanded states for the first few years. The states
that expanded Medicaid are required to provide full Medicaid coverage to adults whose income
are below 133% of FPL. Asset tests and categorical eligibility were canceled in expanded states.
Those states opted out the Medicaid expansion retain asset tests and relatively low income limit.
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Federal government also offer tax credit as subsidy to individuals who purchase private health
insurance in the exchange, if their income are between 100% FPL (138% FPL if living in non-
expanded states) and 400% FPL. The precise amount of subsidy depends on the precise income of
the individual. Individuals who fall in this income category are ineligible for Medicaid. But the
tax subsidy fills in the gap financially.
In summary, younger elderly people (aged 50-64) might benefit from ACA. First, affordable
health insurance plans are now available in the exchange. The ACA is against discrimination on
pre-existing conditions so those who have chronic diseases and need long-term health care now can
purchase health insurance in the private market in a relatively cheaper price than before. Second,
as long as an individual lives in an expanded states, it is now much easier for him/her to qualify
and receive Medicaid in terms of both categorical eligibility and financial eligibility. Because of
these benefits, younger elderly people have less incentive and necessity for a Medicaid divorce. I
raise a hypothesis that the divorce gap at 65 should be smaller in post-ACA era than in pre-ACA
era.
As elaborated above, the existence of asset limit and income limit is the main reason for Med-
icaid divorce. Thus the Medicaid expansion created a natural experiment. We can compare the
divorce gap between expanded states and non-expanded states to infer the effect of the asst test
cancellation.
2.2.5 Social Security Retirement Benefit
For individuals born in 1929 or later, as long as they had been working under Social Security for
at least 10 years, they have an option to start to claim Social Security Retirement (SSR) benefit
3 months before their 62nd birthday, and start to receive the benefit payment at 62. SSR benefit
helps seniors to better plan their post-retirement life. The full retirement age varies from person to
person, according to the year of birth. Typically the full retirement age increases as a person was
born in a later year. For example, the full retirement age of individuals born in 1937 or earlier is
65. For those who were born in 1960 or later, the full retirement age is 67.
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Rigorously speaking, if a person do not claim the SSR payment as early as 62 and wait until
he/she reaches the full retirement age, he/she can receive the full amount of SSR benefit. Early
application at 62 is subject to a discount. For example, for individual whose full retirement age
is 65, if he/she starts to claim SSR payment at 62, then he/she can only receive 80% of the full
monthly benefit for the rest of his/her life. Since people have different retirement plan and different
life expectancy, they choose the starting age of claiming SSR benefit strategically.
After an individual starts to receive benefits, his/her spouse who are aged over 62 can also
apply for at most one half of the same benefits, even if the spouse has not established sufficient
working history. However, the spouse must be married to the benefit recipient for at least one year
before the spouse qualify for the benefit. In addition, individuals who lack working history and are
currently divorced can also receive SSR benefits based on the working record of the ex-spouse. It
requires that the former marriage with the ex-spouse must last for at least 10 years.
The rules of claiming spouse dependent SSR benefits and ex-spouse dependent benefits should
not cause a divorce gap at 65. First, people are not encouraged to suddenly want to keep a broken
marriage at 65 only because the spouse without working history wants to keep the spouse depen-
dent SSR benefits. As long as the couple have been married for at least 10 years, the no-working
spouse can still receive SSR payment in the form of ex-spouse dependent benefits.
Second, there is no large incentive for an immediate remarriage at 65 only because a no-
working single individual wants to get spouse dependent SSR benefits. The one-year marriage
duration requirement mentioned above offsets this incentive. Besides, the starting age is 62 for
the first claim of SSR payment. Why people have to instantaneously get married at precisely 65?
In conclusion, SSR benefits should not be majorly responsible for a divorce discontinuity at 65.
Though the income effect of SSR benefit might have a continuous impact.
2.3 Econometric Method
Age is the most important factor to determine whether an individual qualifies for Medicare cover-
age, other insurance plans supplement to Medicare, and Medicare-Medicaid dual-eligibility. My
36
identification strategy relies on age as an exogenous assignment variable. Those who are just above
the 65-year-old threshold are assigned the eligibility for these Medicare related benefits. Follow-
ing standard settings of regression discontinuity design (RDD) (see Lee and Lemieux (2010)), it
is assumed that the counterfactual divorce behavior is continuous in age at 65, if the eligibility for
these public health insurance benefits never expands at 65 (or expanded all the time). In the con-
text of this paper, the discontinuity in divorce rate at 65 potentially reflects the amount of Medicaid
divorce which were avoided due to the exogenous occurrence of these insurance benefits.
Formally, the regression model is written as:
yi = α +θ ·1(agei ≥ 65)+
p
∑
k=1
β1k ·ageki +
p
∑
k=1
β2k ·ageki ·1(agei ≥ 65)+Xiγ + εi (2.1)
yi is the outcome variable, indicator of divorce. agei is the assignment variable, 1(agei ≥ 65)
is the cutoff variable (an indicator equals 1 if the assignment variable exceeds the 65-threshold,
equals zero otherwise). Xi are a set of covariate controls. εi is a mean zero regression error term.
Since agei is a discrete variable, nonparametric identification is infeasible in this case. I use p-order
polynomial of agei, fully interacted with the cutoff variable, to approximate the true continuous
function. With good enough statistical performance evaluated by certain goodness-of-fit tests, such
as Lee-Card test and AIC statistic, the optimal polynomial order p is chosen (see Lee and Lemieux
(2010), Lee and Card (2009)). Lee and Card (2009) also suggests to use robust standard error
clustered at age to adjust for potential parametric misspecification error.
Following the tradition of empirical papers that implement RDD, the assignment variable agei
is normalized by subtracting 65 form the real age (in years). That is, agei = 0 if individual i is
65, agei = 1 if individual i is 66, and agei = −1 if individual i is 64, etc. Therefore, in the base-
line regression model which excludes controls variables Xi, the intercept α captures the predicted
conuterfactual divorce rate (as a benchmark level) at 65. I report the intercept estimate from the
control-free baseline models. When control variables are included in the regression, the meaning
of the intercept is ambiguous hence it is not reported.
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The reduced-form parameter θ is our parameter of interest. It captures the discontinuity of
divorce rate at 65, which might reflect the existence of a divorce gap and potentially measures
the reduction of Medicaid divorce (as an impact) due to the occurrence of Medicare at 65 . By
comparing the RD estimate θ with the intercept α , we can draw conclusion on the relative change
(change in percent) of the divorce rate.
Social Security Retirement (SSR) benefit by its claiming rules should not have discontinuous
effect on divorce behavior at 65. But the income effect of SSR payment might have a continuous
impact. I will also run RD regressions of Social Security Income to test its continuity. Besides, in
order to control for the continuous income effect, I add Social Security Income into the regression
as a control variable. Other control variables include year effect, state effect, gender, race, and
education level.
2.4 Data
2008-2015 American Community Survey (ACS) is the major data source in this paper. ACS is
an annual interview survey which records 1% national representative random sample each year.
The pooled ACS data set documents almost six million observations and collects rich information
about the interviewees such as their marital status, health insurance status, geographic identifiers,
and a large number of other demographic and economic variables. In regression analysis, our
full sample is restricted to individuals aged between 55 and 75. Age is measured in terms of
years. The full sample size is 5894947. Within each age cohort cell, the number of observations
range from 168377 (75-cohort) to 377064 (55-cohort). Given the large within-cell sample size,
the sample divorce rate and other summary statistics by age cohort should be asymptotically quite
accurate. The large number of observations also allows us to use high-order polynomial (up to 4th
order) to approximate the true continuous trend of divorce rate over age. Although the number
of observations is clearly decreasing as age increases, mortality should not confound my result as
long as mortality does not discontinuously jump at age 65.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of 62-67 cohorts. Notice that health insurance coverage
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rate increases dramatically at age 65. There is also obvious decrease in divorce rate at 65. The
comprehensive analysis result are presented in Section 5.
Heterogeneous effect might exist across different subgroups. In order to identify heterogeneous
effects, I stratify the full sample into subsample based on gender, race, and education level. Be-
sides, as mentioned in Section 2.4, in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Mississippi,
New York, and Vermont, there are no asset tests for participating in Medicare Savings Programs.
Thus I also stratify the sample based on whether the observed individuals resided in these no-limit
states or in states that impose asset limit. To examine whether ACA and Medicaid expansion
had significant impact to reduce Medicaid divorce, I split the sample into subsamples which re-
spectively cover individuals in pre-ACA period (2008-2013), post-ACA period (2014-2015) in
expanded states, and post-ACA period in non-expanded states.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Baseline Results and Robustness Checks
In RDD regression analysis, choice of polynomial order is a critical issue. Suggested by Lee
and Lemieux (2010), I select the optimal polynomial order based on Lee-Card Test statistic and
AIC statistic. Table 2.2 presents the RD coefficient estimates in divorce rate at 65 from various
polynomial specifications. In both of first, second, and third order polynomial regression, the
Lee-Card Tests all reject the null hypothesis at 0.1 significance level. In fourth order polynomial
regression, the null hypothesis is not rejected by the Lee-Card Test. Besides, the fourth order
polynomial regression has the smallest AIC statistic. Therefore, fourth order polynomial is chosen
and considered optimal.
In fact, the RD estimates are all significant and negative regardless of the polynomial order,
indicating that the divorce gap does exist in the full sample and the result is robust. According to
the optimal fourth order regression, the predicted counterfactual divorce rate is 17.22 percentage
points in 65-cohorts. But the divorce rate discretely drops by 0.709 percentage points, which
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accounts for a 4.1 percent decrease.
I also follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) and calculate the robust standard error clustered at age.
Table 2.3 Column (2) reports the result. The significance of the RD estimate is not affected. I also
include demographic controls and SSI controls into the regression model. Both the point estimate
and the clustered standard error do not change a lot, as shown in Column (3) and (4). The point
estimate is -0.678 in the full model in column (4).
Then I vary the RD bandwidth from 2 years to 5 years. Table 2.4 shows that all estimates are
robustly and significantly negative.
Figure 2.3 presents the graphical illustration of the discontinuity in Medicare coverage rate
and Medicaid coverage rate at 65. Table 2.5 reports the RD estimates. The proportion of pop-
ulation being covered by Medicare discretely increased by 63.57 percentage points at 65. The
Medicaid coverage rate also jumped by 1.97 percentage points, which accounts for a 19.4 per-
cent increase. As a consequence, the overall insured rate also discontinuously increased by 8.28
percentage points.
Table 2.6 presents the RD estimates in Social Security Income, retirement income, personal
total income, wage income, employment rate, and weekly working hours. None of these estimates
are significant. Figure 2.4 shows the continuity of these variables. It strongly suggests that the
divorce gap at 65 is not caused by these potential confounders. As already clarified above, the
rules of claiming Social Security Retirement (SSR) spouse dependent benefit or ex-spouse depen-
dent benefit neither discourage divorce at 65 nor encourage immediate remarriage at 65. The RD
estimates and the pictures indicate that the average amount of Social Security Income is also con-
tinuous at 65. In the context of RDD, the income effect of SSI on divorce is at most continuous.
Thus I control for these continuous income effect by adding SSI as a control covariate into the
regression model.
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2.5.2 Divorce Gap Heterogeneity
The divorce gap varies across subpopulation. Splitting the full sample by gender, the RD estimate
is -0.250 for men and -0.967 for women, as presented in Table 2.7. The divorce gap for men
is statistically insignificant, while the women experienced a 4.94 percent significant decrease in
divorce. Adding controls has little impact on the significance and magnitude of the RD estimate.
The gender difference of the divorce gap might suggest that Medicaid divorce is more prevailing
when the sick spouse is female. This result parallels with the descriptive analysis of Karraker and
Latham (2015), which finds that the wife’s illness onset are more likely to incur divorce, while
such association did not exist when the husband got sick.
Huge heterogeneity also exists by race. The RD estimate is insignificant for white people.
However, for black people, the point estimate of the divorce gap is as large as -1.427 percentage
points. which accounts for a 6.11 percent decrease. The point estimate is about twice of the
full-sample estimate. The divorce gap is significant for Asians but insignificant for Hispanics.
Surprisingly, the heterogeneity by education level seems minimum. For those seniors without
a college degree, the point estimate of divorce gap is -0.752. For college educated people, the
estimate is -0.643. They are both significantly nonzero but statistically indistinguishable from
each other.
2.5.3 Discussion: Asset Test
The main purpose for Medicaid divorce is to help the sick spouse to pass the asset test for public
health insurance program eligibility. Since the divorce gap at age 65 measures the discrete re-
duction in Medicaid divorce, the magnitude of the divorce gap should be associated with states’
settings of the asset test.
Here I consider two scenarios: Medicare savings programs and 2014 ACA Medicaid expansion.
First, for a couple aged over 65, it is more likely to get coverage by Medicare savings program if
they reside in states that do not impose asset limit for their Medicare savings programs, rather than
in states that do impose. Thus in states with asset limit, the incentive for a post-65 Medicaid divorce
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should be smaller, which drags down the divorce rate among post-65 cohorts. As a consequence,
we should see a larger divorce gap in these states.
Second, in states expanded Medicaid after 2014, adults aged below 65 can qualify for Med-
icaid coverage as long as they earn an income below 133% FPL, regardless of their asset levels
and categories. The cancellation of the asset test reduced the prevalence of divorce among 50-64
cohorts in expanded states (see Slusky and Ginther (2017)). Since the divorce rate was dragged
down for pre-65 cohorts, we should see a smaller or even insignificant divorce gap in expanded
states after 2014.
As expected, whether states have asset test for Medicare Savings Program plays an important
role in the post-65 reduction of Medicaid divorce. The RD estimates across states are reported in
Table 2.10. In states that does not impose asset test for participating in post-65 Medicare Savings
Programs, the divorce gap estimate is as large as -1.122 percentage points. In states do have an
asset limit, the divorce gap estimate is only -0.498. Both the estimates are significantly nonzero.
And two estimates are also significantly different from each other. The difference between the
divorce gap is graphically obvious, as seen in Figure 2.8. It suggests that the absence of asset tests
in these no-limit states is one of the key drivers to reduce Medicaid divorce.
Table 2.11 presents the estimates by ACA period and Medicaid expansion states. Prior to
2014, the divorce gap estimate is -0.749 percentage points, which accounts for a 4.39 percent
decrease. The divorce gap estimate is -0.570 in non-expanded state after 2014. Although it is
slightly smaller than the pre-ACA divorce gap, it is still significant and these two estimates are
statistically indistinguishable. Not surprisingly, the divorce gap estimate is insignificant in those
post-ACA expanded states. Although the point estimate is actually of considerable scale, but the
standard error is almost identical to the point estimate. As a consequence, the t-statistic is not
large enough to reject the nonzero null hypothesis. The absence of evidence for divorce gap in
post-ACA expanded states suggestively indicates that Medicaid divorce is reduced due to the asset
test cancellation and enhanced income limit.
Separated couples are still legally married. Separation do not influence the asset level of the
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sick spouse. I find no evidence of “separation gap" at the 65-threshold, as indicated in Table 2.12.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I address the question about how age-based public health insurance eligibility can pos-
sibly affect divorce behavior and family structure. Once an individual reaches 65, he/she can access
uniform and affordable Original Medicare coverage. Besides, seniors are offered a menu of Medi-
gap policies, Medicare Advantage plans, Medicare savings programs, and Medicaid-Medicare dual
eligibility, which further reduce and cap the out-of-pocket expense on health care. These public
health insurance benefits shield the risk of spend down hence offset the incentive and necessity for
Medicaid divorce. Based on this idea, my empirical analysis finds the divorce rate decreased by
about 0.7 percentage points at 65 in the entire United States during 2008-2015.
My heterogeneity analysis suggests that Medicaid divorce is more prevalent for black couples.
Also, if the female spouse is the sick spouse, a Medicaid divorce would be more likely to happen.
This study has several policy implications. As many studies have pointed out, the rules of
Medicaid eligibility for couples is flawed (see Miller (2015)). The restrictive financial requirement
(especially the asset test) is the main reason to cause Medicaid divorce. Although Medicaid di-
vorce is, to some extent, “fake" divorce, it undoubtedly incurs welfare loss 4. A revised system of
eligibility rules which relax the restriction for the healthy spouse is called for. Policies like Afford-
able Care Act and Medicaid expansion which aim at expanding the provision of low-cost health
insurance plans and expanding the coverage range of public health insurance might significantly
improve the marriage welfare of nearly elderly couples.
4Kristof, Nicholas. “Until Medical Bills Do Us Part," The New York Times, Aug 29, 2009
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Figure 2.1: Correlation Coefficient between Being Divorced and Being Covered by Medicaid, from
25-cohort to 85-cohort
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Figure 2.2: Regression Discontinuity in Divorce Rate at 65
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Figure 2.3: Regression Discontinuity in Medicare Coverage Rate and Medicaid Coverage Rate at
65
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Figure 2.4: Regression Discontinuity in Potential Confounders at 65
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Figure 2.5: Regression Discontinuity in Divorce Rate at 65, by Gender
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Figure 2.6: Regression Discontinuity in Divorce Rate at 65, by Race
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Figure 2.7: Regression Discontinuity in Divorce Rate at 65, by Education
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Figure 2.8: Regression Discontinuity in Divorce Rate at 65, by Whether States Impose Asset Limit
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Figure 2.9: Regression Discontinuity in Divorce Rate at 65, by ACA and Medicaid Expansion
52
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
55 60 65 70 75
0.
01
5
0.
02
0
0.
02
5
Full Sample
Age
S
ep
ar
at
e 
R
at
e
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
55 60 65 70 75
0.
01
5
0.
02
0
0.
02
5
0.
03
0
Women
Age
S
ep
ar
at
e 
R
at
e
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
55 60 65 70 75
0.
04
0
0.
04
5
0.
05
0
0.
05
5
0.
06
0
0.
06
5
0.
07
0
Black
Age
S
ep
ar
at
e 
R
at
e
Figure 2.10: Regression Discontinuity in Separation Rate at 65
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Age 62-67 Cohorts
Age
62 63 64 65 66 67
# Observations 326836 311471 300366 296878 277405 262717
Divorce Rate 17.99 17.62 17.37 16.48 16.39 16.09
Health Insurance:
Insured Rate 89.17 89.30 89.62 97.87 98.59 98.72
Medicare Coverage 11.21 12.26 16.77 86.09 92.91 94.92
Medicaid Coverage 10.48 10.45 10.37 12.13 12.24 12.59
Demographic Covariates:
Female 52.07 52.18 52.46 52.69 52.60 53.12
White 81.08 81.58 81.83 82.02 82.94 83.17
Black 10.40 10.20 10.02 9.83 9.39 9.31
College 52.93 52.36 51.18 49.98 49.29 47.85
Employment and Income Covariates:
Employed 51.15 46.04 42.26 35.97 31.53 28.07
Weekly Work Hours 22.45 19.69 17.83 15.16 13.05 11.25
Wage Income 27226 23838 21377 17744 15049 12478
Retirement Income 5338 5943 6344 6798 7216 7345
Personal Total Income 42906 42223 41089 39809 39998 38936
Social Security Income 2895 5009 5833 7523 9922 11399
Data source: American Community Survey 2008-2015 data.
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Table 2.2: Discontinuity Estimates in Divorce Rate at Age 65, with Different Polynomial Order
Specifications
Full Sample
Dependent variable: Indicator for divorce
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff −0.608∗∗∗ −0.624∗∗∗ −0.249∗ −0.709∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.095) (0.143) (0.228)
Intercept 17.470∗∗∗ 17.251∗∗∗ 16.801∗∗∗ 17.217∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.078) (0.129) (0.218)
Polynomial Order 1 2 3 4
Lee-Card Test 0.000 0.003 0.081 0.162
AIC 14585755 14585702 14585680 14585675
N 5894947 5894947 5894947 5894947
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted
by personal sampling weight. OLS standard errors are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
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Table 2.3: Discontinuity Estimates in Divorce Rate at Age 65
Full Sample
Dependent variable: Indicator for divorce
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff −0.709∗∗∗ −0.709∗∗∗ −0.673∗∗∗ −0.678∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185)
Intercept 17.217∗∗∗ 17.217∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.182)
Clustered SE No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes
SSI Control No No No Yes
N 5894947 5894947 5894947 5894947
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The basic model includes quartic polynomial of age, fully
interacted with indicator 1(age ≥ 65). Demographic control variables include indicators for year, state, gender,
race, and education. The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted by
personal sampling weight. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
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Table 2.4: Discontinuity Estimates in Divorce Rate at Age 65, with Different Bandwith Specifica-
tions
Dependent variable: Indicator for divorce
Age range: 63 - 67 62 - 68 61 - 69 60 - 70
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff −0.611∗∗∗ −0.587∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗ −0.402∗∗ −0.587∗∗∗ −0.578∗∗∗ −0.508∗∗∗ −0.514∗∗
(0.039) (0.056) (0.133) (0.145) (0.160) (0.168) (0.159) (0.166)
Intercept 17.122∗∗∗ 17.039∗∗∗ 17.236∗∗∗ 17.202∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.037) (0.086) (0.054)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1448837 1448837 2022191 2022191 2586022 2586022 3161120 3161120
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include a linear term of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted
by personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05,
*** 0.01)
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Table 2.5: Discontinuity Estimates in Insurance Coverage at Age 65
Full Sample
Dependent variable: Medicare Coverage Medicaid Coverage Any Insurance Coverage
(1) (2) (3)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff 63.572∗∗∗ 1.971∗∗∗ 8.283∗∗∗
(0.980) (0.157) (0.290)
Intercept 22.820∗∗∗ 10.155∗∗∗ 89.630∗∗∗
(0.922) (0.157) (0.285)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No
N 5894947 5894947 5894947
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted
by personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05,
*** 0.01)
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Table 2.6: Discontinuity Estimates in Potentially Confounding Covariates at Age 65
Full Sample
Dependent variable: Social Secu-
rity Income
Retirement
Income
Total In-
come
Wage In-
come
Employed Weekly
Working
Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff 110 44 -537 103 0.002 -0.65
(756) (104) (360) (525) (0.015) (0.45)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5894947 5894947 5894947 5894947 5894947 5894947
The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted with indicator 1(age≥ 65). Control variables include year
effect, state effect, gender, race, and education. The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All
regressions are weighted by personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in
parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
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Table 2.7: Discontinuity Estimates in Divorce Rate at Age 65, by Gender
Dependent variable: Indicator for divorce
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff -0.250 -0.197 −0.967∗∗∗ −1.063∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.191) (0.217) (0.193)
Intercept 14.656∗∗∗ 19.596∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.165)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 2788260 2788260 3106687 3106687
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). Control variables include year effect, state effect, gender, race, education, and Social
Security Income. The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted by
personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05,
*** 0.01)
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Table 2.8: Discontinuity Estimates in Divorce Rate at Age 65, by Race
Dependent variable: Indicator for divorce
White Black Asian Hispanic
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff -0.036 0.062 −1.427∗∗∗ −1.493∗∗∗ −0.829∗∗ −0.912∗∗ −0.720 −0.422
(0.164) (0.164) (0.375) (0.360) (0.388) (0.367) (0.619) (0.624)
Intercept 16.243∗∗∗ 23.374∗∗∗ 9.476∗∗∗ 16.586∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.306) (0.353) (0.602)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 4916158 4916158 539317 539317 214664 214664 426896 426896
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). Control variables include year effect, state effect, gender, race, education, and Social
Security Income. The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted by
personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, ***
0.01)
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Table 2.9: Discontinuity Estimates in Divorce Rate at Age 65, by Education
Dependent variable: Indicator for divorce
Noncollege College
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff −0.752∗∗∗ −0.723∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗ −0.601∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.205) (0.197) (0.179)
Intercept 17.386∗∗∗ 17.025∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.195)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 3006951 3006951 2887996 2887996
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). Control variables include year effect, state effect, gender, race, education, and Social
Security Income. The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted by
personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05,
*** 0.01)
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Table 2.10: Discontinuity Estimates in Divorce Rate at Age 65, by Whether States Sets Up MSP
Asset Limit
Dependent variable: Indicator for divorce
With-Limit States No-Limit States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff −0.498∗∗ −0.468∗∗ −1.122∗∗∗ −1.029∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.200) (0.265) (0.305)
Intercept 17.095∗∗∗ 17.080∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.256)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 5140290 5140290 754657 754657
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). Control variables include year effect, state effect, gender, race, education, and Social
Security Income. The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted by
personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05,
*** 0.01)
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Table 2.11: Discontinuity Estimates in Divorce Rate at Age 65, by ACA Period and Medicaid
Expansion States
Dependent variable: Indicator for divorce
Pre-ACA Post-ACA Nonexpanded Post-ACA Expanded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff −0.749∗∗∗ −0.679∗∗ −0.570∗ −0.633∗∗ -0.631 -0.760
(0.241) (0.251) (0.276) (0.250) (0.634) (0.565)
Intercept 17.070∗∗∗ 17.369∗∗∗ 17.897∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.274) (0.633)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 4285358 4285358 962974 962974 646615 646615
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). Control variables include year effect, state effect, gender, race, education, and Social
Security Income. The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted by
personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05,
*** 0.01)
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Table 2.12: Discontinuity Estimates in Separation Rate at Age 65
Dependent variable: Indicator for separation
Full Sample Women Black
(1) (2) (3)
Age ≥ 65 cutoff -0.094 -0.047 -0.349
(0.068) (0.076) (0.309)
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 5894947 3106687 539317
The estimates are reported in terms of percentage points. The models include polynomial of age, fully interacted
with indicator 1(age≥ 65). The estimates are based on pooled 2008-2015 ACS data. All regressions are weighted
by personal sampling weight. Robust standard errors clustered at age are reported in parentheses. (* 0.1, ** 0.05,
*** 0.01)
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Chapter 3
Job Polarization During Economic Expansion: 2000-2006
Housing Boom and U.S. Labor Market Occupational
Composition
3.1 Introduction
Job polarization since 1980s reshaped the labor market occupational composition in the U.S. There
exited relatively declining trend in employment and wages for jobs ranked in the middle by the
education level of workers. On the other hand, both the employment share and wages of jobs
ranked in the upper side and the lower side were relatively increasing. The “U-shape" structure
of the employment change and wage change of the U.S. jobs is put on the agenda table. It does
not only seize the attention from academics, but it is also influencing the recent US presidential
election debate. The disappearing of middle-skill jobs—and the complaint from the people became
unemployed, tend to affect the future policy making in subjects like globalization, outsourcing,
international trade, and foreign immigrants.
Due to the importance of this issue, researchers in economics devote to find an explanation for
the recent job polarization trend. Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Acemoglu and Autor (2010)
stressed the task contents of occupations. For each job, there are three dimensions of tasks which
require different skills of the person working in that job. Abstract tasks require people to think ab-
stractly and conduct interpersonal communications adaptively. Routine tasks require people to stay
focused on a certain set of standardized activity. Manual tasks require people to coordinate eyes,
hands, and feet to deal with the inconsistently changing situations. To sum up, people working in
66
a job position apply their skills on different tasks to produce output. There exists strong relation
between people’s education level and the tasks they regularly perform in their jobs. The majority
of the disappearing middle-skill jobs, as mentioned above, happens to be intensive in routine tasks.
Researchers argue that the technological change in recent decades is biased to the routine tasks.
It’s complementary to people performing abstract tasks and manual tasks. The routine workers,
however, are being replaced by machine automation. Technology advancement is reducing the
demand of routine intensive occupations which are ranked in the middle in terms of wages and
education level. The workers used to work in these routine jobs are forced to shift toward the jobs
in lower rank or in higher rank. According to the recent empirical research, a lot of evidences
support that Routine Biased Technological Change (RBTC) is a powerful explanation to the job
polarization in recent decades. In fact, the RBTC and the job polarization are reshaping the struc-
ture of the U.S. labor composition. The concept of division of labor by Adam Smith overspreads
to the global economy. Not only in the U.S., but also in other modern industrialized countries,
more higher-educated people are working on innovative activity such as STEM and art, pushing
the human civilization forward. People with lower education are directed to the nontradable ser-
vice sector of the local community. The old-fashion, labor-intensive routine tasks are shifted to
developing countries, which have comparative advantages in labor cost.
Living in the historical era of the U.S. job polarization, researchers discovered that the de-
creases in the employment share of routine occupations were concentrated in the period of eco-
nomic recession. Jaimovich and Siu (2014) pointed out that in the three recent business cycles,
although the aggregate output recovered soon after the recession trough, the jobs were gone for-
ever. The employment rate and participation rate did not bounce back to the pre-recession level.
From the aggregate data, the economic recovery is “jobless". When we disaggregate the data by
occupations, among these forever-gone jobs, over 100% of them contained intensive routine tasks
in the 1982 recession. On the contrary, employment share in non-routine intensive occupations
actually increased relative to the pre-recession level. Evidence shows that the job polarization
phenomenon is closely related to the business cycles.
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In this paper, I focus on the other side of the story: What’s the pattern of the change of em-
ployment in routine occupations and non-routine occupations during the boom period? Intuitively,
economic boom should create employment opportunities due to the increasing aggregate demand.
More people would be filled in job positions. However, whether the routine workers would benefit
from the economic expansion is not that intuitive. Further analysis needs to be conducted to give
an answer. This paper aims to address this problem.
The most recent large-scale economic expansion in the U.S. was the housing boom in early
2000s. Figure 3.1 clearly shows that the housing price level experienced rapid rise starting from
late 1990s. The housing price didn’t drop until about 2006. Local housing boom is a measurement
of local economic prosperity. The most direct effect of local housing boom on local employment
opportunities is in construction sector—You have to hire people to build (Charles, Hurst and No-
towidigdo (2016)). Indirectly, local housing boom might potentially increase the local demand for
certain jobs through spillover effect. Purchases and buildings of houses occur in a city mainly for
two reasons: (1) People living there are getting wealthy; (2) People are moving into the city. Both
of the reasons are potential signals to increasing demand for jobs.
My main contribution to the literature can be summarized into three points: First, I pay my
attention to the period of economic expansion. As mentioned above, local housing boom is a
very good indicator for expanding labor economy. Thus I study the effect of housing boom on
local employment. It is interesting to ask whether the short-term housing boom during 2000-2006
would increase the demand for certain routine intensive jobs, even though in the long run their
employment shares are shrinking due to the RBTC. In the literature, most of the previous research
discussed the pattern of decadal change, say, from 1980s to 2000s. And there exist few papers on
connecting economic boom with job polarization.
Second, I estimate the effect of the short-term housing boom and the effect of the RBTC on
the local labor market outcome at the same time. Following the spirit of Autor, Dorn and Hanson
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(2015) 1 , I put the housing boom and the routine share 2 simultaneously on the right-hand side as
explanatory variables.
Third, I classify all 465 3-digit occupations, which were defined in the 2000 census data, into
eight groups. I make the classification based on the education level of the people in these jobs,
and the degree of task intensity of the occupations. These eight occupation groups are named:
high-skill local service, professor, professional, office and administrative support, others, low-skill
local service, production, and construction. These occupation groups are well characterized by the
nature of the jobs, the skills equipped by an average worker, the content of tasks they carry, and
their average wages. These details would be covered in Section 3. In Autor and Dorn (2013), they
found a dacadal pattern that in an initially highly “routine" city, low-skill labor force would transit
from the routine intensive jobs to the low-skill, low-payed service sectors. While they defined the
service occupation group by job titles, I define local service occupations in a much broader sense,
and they are not limited to low-skill jobs. In the spirit of Moretti (2012), I pick an occupations
into the local service group, if the people working in this occupation offer service directly to
the local consumers, and the service is relatively non-tradable to consumers far away. By my
approach, some high-skill, high-pay jobs are also included in the local service occupation group.
The detailed classification of occupations enables us to perform thorough shift-share analysis. It
helps us to identify the major beneficiaries in the labor market during the 2000s housing boom,
and to identify the occupations to which the sacked routine workers shifted. Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4,
and Figure 3.5 show the national aggregate employment shares in occupation groups.
Local labor market approach is employed in my empirical study. The degree of the housing
boom, or more precisely, the magnitude of the increase in the house price level, were very different
among different cities. For example, cities near the coastal areas experienced a rapid rise in housing
price, while the housing market in Kansas and Texas were relatively mild. Besides, the initial labor
1 In Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2015), the authors simultaneously estimated the effect of exposure to competition
with China’s import in manufacturing, and the effect of RBTC.
2 Routine share is a measure of the routine intensity of the local labor market employment composition. If a local
labor market has a higher routine share, then it is more exposed to the RBTC, and a larger decline of demand for
routine tasks is predicted. See sections below.
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composition structure were also very different among cities . For example, we should expect a
larger share of routine workers resided in Detroit, a typical manufacturing specialized city, than in
San Francisco, which is famous for its vivid activity of IT innovation.
I exploit the cross-sectional variation of the housing boom from 2000-2006, and the cross-
sectional variation of the initial labor market structure in 2000, to examine how different cities
would respond to these “shocks" in terms of employment and wage in various occupations. The
numerous cities and their fixed geographical locations provide us with a data set of panel structure
and with relatively large sample size. The local labor market approach is proved successful in
recent empirical labor market research. See Autor and Dorn (2013), Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013), Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2015), Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo (2016).
Through the most direct demand shock to the construction occupations, housing shock signifi-
cantly increase the employment share in construction occupations. A city at the 75th percentile of
housing boom experienced increase the employment share than a 25th-percentile city 6.4% more.
The effect of the housing boom is widespread. Housing boom also boost the employment share in
low-skill occupations such as low-skill local service, and office administrative support.
Besides, the RBTC significantly reduced the employment share in all two major routine occu-
pation groups—office administrative support, and production. A city with 75th percentile of the
routine share significantly reduced the employment share in office occupations by 2.2%, than a
25th-percentile city. The 75th-to-25th employment loss in office occupations is even larger among
noncollege population. The number is as large as 4.2%.
I also implement a wage regression which exploits the rich information about individual char-
acteristics in the micro data. I study how the wage income for individuals working in different
occupations and in different locations would respond to the local housing boom and the initial
local labor market employment composition.
The rest of the paper are divided into four sections. In Section 2 I introduce a simple demand-
supply model to identify the one-way effect of housing boom on local labor market outcome. An
instrumental variable empirical approach is stimulated by this framework. In Section 3 I present
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the source of the data, how I proxy the variables with data in the empirical settings, and the method
of measuring and constructing the variables with data. In Section 4 I present the main empirical
result of this paper. In the end, Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Approach
3.2.1 Employment Regression
In my empirical analysis, a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is the a unit of local labor market.
MSAs are defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). An MSA is a geographical
region where high population density and economic activities are concentrated. It’s assumed that
the workers in an MSA can shift between jobs and sectors without moving out of the MSA, so
it’s very suitable unit of measurement of local labor markets. The shortcoming for MSAs is that
they don’t cover the whole area of the US. Many rural locations with low population density is not
included in any MSAs. Therefore, the analysis in this paper is only on urban areas.
In order to estimate the causal effect of the local housing boom on the local labor market
outcome, the starting point is to untangle the demand-side effect and supply-side effect. Local
housing boom is a proxy of local economic prosperity, hence it creates employment opportunity.
This would be reflected in the local labor market outcome.
On the other hand, the local labor market outcome would have certain impact on both local
housing demand and supply. If more people are employed, or more immigrants from other places
flow in, then they need a place of residence. What’s more, the increase of people working in
certain sectors such as construction, mortgage finance, and housing agency, would directly affect
the housing construction and sales activity.
In summary, housing boom as a labor demand shock, would affect the local labor market out-
come. Reversely, change in local labor market employment would stimulate local housing price
level through both housing demand channel and housing supply channel. The ideas above can be
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written as two simultaneous equations:
4L j = β0 +β14H j +β24LDOj +β34LSi + ε j (3.1)
4H j = α14L j + f (θ j,4HND)+ e j (3.2)
First, let’s look at Equation (1). In MSA j, the local labor market outcome, 4L j, is jointly
determined by the local labor demand shock and the local labor supply shock. In my paper, the
local economic prosperity brought by the housing boom is a major source of the labor demand
shock. Thus a measure of local housing boom, 4H j, plays a role in the right-hand side. The rest
of the demand shock is captured by the variable4LDOj , the labor demand shock from other sectors.
I leave the labor supply shock4LSj unobserved in my analysis. Also, some other unobserved mean
zero disturbance, ε j, might affect the labor market outcome.
Empirically, I use the log change of MSA-level Housing Price Index (HPI) to proxy the local
housing boom labor demand shock4H j.
4H j = log(HPI j,2006)− log(HPI j,2000)
Routine Biased Technological Change (RBTC) is also a labor demand shock. Stem from Autor
and Dorn (2013), routine share RSH j has become a popular empirical measurement to study job
polarization. Routine share is the ratio of labor supply in well-defined 3 routine occupations to
the total labor supply, in MSA j. Autor and Dorn’s theoretical model predicts that if initially a
city more intensively had its labor force employed in routine occupations, then in that city more
employment share will be shifted from routine occupations to non-routine job positions, due to the
declining demand for routine tasks caused by RBTC.
In standard spatial equilibrium models in urban economics (Roback (1982), Moretti (2011)),
the growth of employment level and immigrant inflow in a city will raise the housing demand in
that city. Therefore, the local labor market outcome might reversely boost the local housing boom,
3The precise definition of routine share is left in Secton 3.
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causing endogeneity problem. Equation (2) captures this reverse direction.
Some of the recent research focus on the supply side of the housing market (Glaeser, Gyourko
and Saiz (2008), Gyourko (2009)). Suppose there are two cities: city A has higher housing supply
elasticity, and city B has a lower one. They have the same housing demand curve. If positive
housing demand shocks at the same level comes to the two cities, then the demand curve will shift
right for the same level. Holding everything else constant, city A will experience higher quantity
increase and lower price increase. Conversely, city B will experience lower quantity increase and
higher price increase. Thus housing supply elasticity plays a critical role in the degree and the type
of local housing boom.
In the second term of Equation (2), the local housing supply elasticity θ j, interacted with the
national trend of housing boom 4HND, is also a determinant of the local housing boom. e j is a
mean zero error term. In this case, housing supply elasticity might be a potential instrument for
our purpose.
Many papers argued that the variation of geographical factors and local housing building reg-
ulations are two of the sources to explain why housing supply elasticity varied across cities. For
example, Saiz (2010), Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008). Thanks to the contribution of the au-
thors, such data are available and becoming widely applied in research. In Saiz (2010), the author
estimated the local housing supply elasticity as a linear combination of local land unavailability
index and local regulation index. The estimated elasticity has very high predictive power on the
decadal change of local housing prices. Besides, Saiz (2010) found that the land unavailability
index is uncorrelated with many labor supply factors. I employ theses two indexes as instruments
to address the endogeneity problem. The identification assumption is that the unobserved local
labor supply shock and the unobserved error term are uncorrelated with the two indexes.
Then I try to estimate the equation
4L j = β0 +β14H j +β2RSH j + γX j +u j (3.3)
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Instrument : Land j,Reg j,RSH j,X j
where X j are the control variables specified below. The parameters of interest are β1 and β2. The
instrumental variable strategy provides with identification of β1. The causal effect of the housing
boom demand shock on the local labor market outcome can be estimated.
After I set up the right-hand side, I then put many variables measuring local labor market
outcome on the left-hand side. For example, the change in local employment ratio among different
populations of interest, and the change in employment share of different occupation groups. By
the regressions of the employment share change in all occupations, the parameters β1 can tell us
the housing boom increase the demand for which categories of occupations. And the parameters
β2 can give us a picture of the change of the US labor market structure — how the RBTC shift the
labor force from occupations to occupations.
3.2.2 Wage Regression
Besides of the employment share, wage is also an indicator of workers’ welfare. If the local
housing boom represents a demand shock for the local labor market, we expect positive causal
effect of housing boom on workers’ wages change. Moreover, we should expect negative causal
effect of local routine share on routine workers wages change. This is because higher routine share
represents higher potential decline of demand in such routine occupations. On the other hand, the
causal effect of local routine share on non-routine workers’ wages is a little ambiguous ex ante.
If the RBTC shift the labor force from routine occupations to non-routine occupations, then the
increase in the supply of the non-routine workers might possibly lower the amount of overall wage
raise of the non-routine occupations.
The rich information about individual wage income, occupation, and demographic character-
istics in the census data enable us to implement a wage regression. I develop a difference-in-
difference type model to estimate the effect of MSA-level housing boom and local routine share
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on individual wages:
wi jkt = ρk[4RSH j ·1(t = 2006)]+ψXi +αt +δ j +φk + ei jkt (3.4)
where wi jkt is the log weekly labor income of individual i working in occupation k in MSA j in
year t. The MSA-level change in routine share between 2000 and 2006, RSH j, is the variables of
interest. Time fixed effect αt (t = 2000 or t = 2006), MSA fixed effect δ j, and occupation fixed
effect φk are included in the regression. Xi are a rich set of individual characteristics which serve
as control variables. Our main goal is to estimate ρk, the occupation-specific effect.
The empirical results are presented in Section 4.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Local Labor Market and Local Housing Boom
The major data source for constructing MSA-level labor market variables are 2000 census and
2001-2011 American Community Survey (ACS), which are extracted from the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) database (Ruggles et.al. (2015)). The census data and ACS data
provide with rich information about the individuals taking the survey. Variables such as geographic
location, demographic characteristics, education level, employment status, occupation, industry,
working hours, and wage income are included in the data set. It’s convenient to compute the
employment statistics for target populations in target locations. When I calculate the MSA level
and national level aggregate employment statistics, each individual is appropriately weighted by
his/her census weight. In my specification, a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is a geographical
unit of local labor market. 283 MSAs are identified by the "METAREA" variable in the dataset.
METAREA designations are based on 1999 US Office for Management and Budget delineations of
MSA. Throughput the paper, I restrict attention to the population aged 18-64, who are the majority
of the labor force in the economy. Noncollege workers are defined as the people who never finished
75
at least one year of college study (i.e. EDUC<7).
In the wage regression, weekly wage is used. An individual’s weekly wage is calculated as
his/her total annual wage income ("INCWAGE") divided by the weeks s/he worked in the whole
year. The annual working weeks is the product of his/her usual hours worked per week ("UHR-
SWORK") and weeks worked in the whole year ("WKSWORK1"). The product of annual working
weeks times and individual census weight serves his/her labor supply weight in the wage regres-
sion.
I adopt the Housing Price Index (HPI) data from Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), to
proxy the degree of the housing boom. Quarterly All-transaction Indexes at the level of Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas and Divisions are used. Yearly index is obtained by averaging four quarterly
indexes in each year. The MSA definition in FHFA is slightly different from that in 2000 census
and ACS. I match the HPI to the ACS MSA by hand. As a result, 282 MSAs are matched with HPI
data. The housing shock variable4H j, is defined as log(HPI j,2006)− log(HPI j,2000).
The land unavailability index and the local regulation index are achieved from Saiz (2010),
Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008), and Diamond (2016). The land unavailability index was first
developed by Saiz (2010). He used geographic information system (GIS) and United States Geo-
graphic Service (USGS), to measure the share of the area consisting of steep slopes, oceans, lakes,
wetlands, and other water features, in each MSA. The local regulation index was first developed
by Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008). They sent out a survey to over 6800 municipalities across
all major housing markets in the US. Based on the returned respond to the questions on the sur-
vey, they integrated a single local land regulatory index. I aggregate the index into the ACS MSA
level by simply averaging the indexes of those municipalities which fall into a certain MSA. These
two indexes are widely applied in labor economics research, such as Diamond (2016a), Diamond
(2016b). The land unavailable index was proved uncorrelated with many local labor supply factor
in Saiz (2010), thus it’s very suitable to be our instrument. In my paper, the land unavailability
index and the local regulation index are matched to 238 MSAs and 251 MSAs, respectively. It
reduces the regression sample size when 2SLS estimation is implemented.
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3.3.2 Task Measures and Occupation Groups
The data of task contents in each occupation come from the U.S. Department of Labor Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (DOT) and O*NET database. Following Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003),
Autor and Dorn (2013), I match each occupation with three dimensions of tasks: abstract task,
routine task, and manual task. The abstract task measure is the average of two DOT variables:
“direction control and planning" and “GED Math". The routine task measure is the average of “set
limits, tolerances, and standards" and “finger dexterity". The manual task measure is simply the
DOT variable measuring “eye-hand-foot coordination".
To identify a routine occupation, we have to consider how "relatively routine" an occupation
is. Suppose there are two jobs. The routine score of the two jobs are identical, but the first job
contains more abstract tasks and manual tasks than the second one. Then we should consider the
second job is more routine than the first one because workers in the first job have to apply his/her
skill to deal with the abstract tasks and manual tasks, hence the full duty of the first job is not
all in routine tasks. We call for a measure which values routine tasks and devalues the other two
categories of tasks. Following Autor and Dorn (2013), I adopt the summary measure of routine
task intensity, RTI, which is computed as:
RT Ik = log(Rk)− log(Ak)− log(Mk) (3.5)
where Rk, Ak, and Mk are the routine task score, abstract task score, and manual task score, respec-
tively, for occupation k. If an occupation k contains more routine tasks, fewer abstract tasks and
fewer manual tasks, then it has a higher RTI index.
Based on the task measures and the nature of the occupations, I classify all 465 3-digit occu-
pations into eight groups. They are high-skill local service, low-skill local service, construction,
office administration and support, production, professor, professional, and others. The mean task
scores and RTI index are computed for these occupation groups. In Table 3.1, I rank these eight
groups by how many shares of these jobs are taken by college-educated workers in 2000.
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In Autor and Dorn (2013), their focus is on low-income, low-skill service occupations by the
job titles. In my paper, the local service occupations I define here are in a broader sense than they
did. I pick the occupations into the local service group by the criterion that people working in these
occupations directly offer service to the local consumers, and the service is relatively nontradable
to the consumers far away. For example, a waiter working in Lawrence can only serve the people
who walk in this Lawrence restaurant, but s/he can not serve a person eating in New York. And a
kindergarten teacher in Kansas City cannot take care of a 5-year-old kid in Boston. On the other
hand, the items produced by a assembly line worker can be shipped to any corner of the world.
And a trader in Wall Street can take transaction orders from Wichita.
What’s more, the local service group I define here covers not only low-skill jobs, but it also
covers high-skill jobs. For example, social service workers are usually required a degree majored
in social work. Before becoming a doctor, a person needs to go to medicine school to receive
comprehensive training. I separate these occupation into high-skill service group and low-skill
service group based on the college ratio. Surprisingly, the high-skill local service occupations
have the highest college ratio among all occupations.
For the rest of the high-skill jobs, some of them contain considerable routine tasks, while oth-
ers do not. According to this criterion, I divide the rest of the high-skill jobs into two groups:
professional and professor. As we see, the professor group consists of architects, engineers, and
researchers in life, physical, and social science. Surprisingly, these occupations have an above-
average routine task score. The professional group consists of managers, business operators, finan-
cial specialists, programmers, legal practitioners, and media practitioners. All of these occupations
contain less routine content than an average job.
The most routine intensive occupations are office administration and support, and production.
In fact, they are the only two occupation groups whose RTI scores are higher than the average
overall RTI score and are positive. All other occupation groups has a below-average RTI score.
Assembly line work, text typing, record sorting, and printing machine operation seem to be greatly
exposed to the technology shock. It’s natural to conjecture that the employment share in these two
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occupations are facing very large negative shock by the RBTC.
My interest is also on the construction workers, since the demand shock to these workers gen-
erated by the housing boom should be quite big— You need to hire people to build. Construction
workers take a heavy load of manual tasks. Most of them don’t have a college degree. In fact, the
manual task score of the construction group is the highest among all bold-face occupation groups.
If we compare the college ratio of each occupation group with the overall college ratio, we
can identify high-skill service, professor, and professional as high-skill jobs. The remaining oc-
cupation groups are identified as low-skill jobs. Generally speaking, the abstract task scores of
high-skill jobs are pretty high. All of them have an above-average abstract task scores. As compar-
ison, all low-skill occupations have a below-average abstract task scores, except for the retail sales
occupation. Besides, low-skill jobs contain more manual contents, and the manual task scores of
high-skill jobs are usually lower.
Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.3 in the appendix section shows the national aggregate
employment shares in these occupation groups during 2000-2011. After 2006, the housing bubble
burst, and the Great Recession came. So we should expect a downward trend of the employment
share after 2006. Figure 3.3 verifies this conjecture. The national employment share in construc-
tion occupation increased quite a bit during 2000-2006, from 3.8 percent to 4.4 percent. About 1.9
million people are employed as a construction worker during these period. Of course, the construc-
tion bubble burst after the housing bubble burst. The employment share in construction dropped
drastically staring from 2006. In 2011, the employment share was even lower than the 2000 level.
Figure 3.4 tells another story. The employment share in office administrative support, produc-
tion, and professor experienced a decadal decline since the 21st century. Even during 2000-2006,
the housing boom period, the employment didn’t show a trend of growth. As mentioned above,
these occupations contain relatively more routine tasks. When the RBTC theory predicts the de-
clining demand of routine occupations, my empirical analysis will test the RBTC effect on these
occupations. The effect of the housing boom and the RBTC will also be untangled: did hous-
ing boom contributed anything to boost at least some of the employment opportunities in these
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occupations?
Oppositely, the employment in local service jobs was strong. As Figure 3.3 shows, the upward
trend of the employment share in local service didn’t stop until 2008. Even though the employment
went down a little bit after 2008, the employment share in local service in 2011 was higher than
the 2000 level. During 2000-2008, approximately 3 million people were employed in high-skill
service jobs. This number for low-skill service jobs is even higher: 7.5 million people found jobs
in low-skill service occupations. The employment gain in service jobs are substantial, not only in
low-skill local service, but also in high-skill local service.
3.3.3 Routine Share
We need to construct a variable which measures the local labor market exposure to the Routine Bi-
ased Technological Change. Following Autor and Dorn (2013), I adopt the routine share variable.
The routine share RSH j can be constructed with the task measure:
RSH j =
∑
K
k=1 L jk,20001(RT Ik > RT I
P66)
∑
K
k=1 L jk,2000
(3.6)
where L jk,2000 is the total working weeks supplied by workers in occupation k in MSA j in year
2000, RT IP66 is the 66th percentile of the RT I index among all occupations. The routine share
variable measures the portion of the labor supply toward the routine tasks in a city.
According to the theoretical model in Autor and Dorn (2013), if the labor force of a local labor
market are more initially concentrated in routine occupations, then the RBTC will have larger effect
on the employment shifting in this local labor market. More routine workers will be replaced by
automation technology, and these workers will shift to other occupations. Therefore, routine share
is a suitable variable to measure the degree of local RBTC shock on occupation groups. It’s also
an empirical measurement of labor demand shock in equation (1).
Autor and Dorn (2013) suggests that the routine share should be instrumented by RSH∗j , which
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is computed as:
RSH∗j =
M
∑
m=1
L jm,2000
L j,2000
RSH− j,m =
M
∑
m=1
L jm,2000
L j,2000
∑
K
k=1 L− j,mk,20001(RT Ik > RT I
P66)
∑
K
k=1 L− j,mk,2000
(3.7)
The idea is similar to the construction of the Bartik measure (Bartik (1991)). RSH∗j is the inter-
action between the labor supply ratio in each industry in MSA j, and the leave-one-out national
routine share of each industry. If cyclical, short-term expansion is going through in certain in-
dustries in 2000 in MSA j, then RSH j might not reflect the latent real routine intensity in MSA
i, especially when these expansive industries are (non)routine intensive industries. To instrument
RSH j by RSH∗j can address this issue.
Figure 3.2 shows that the routine share and its instrument are highly correlated. Table 3.3 in
the appendix section shows that the predictive power of the instrument is strong.
In the difference-in-difference wage regression model, I also adopt the change in routine share
as a right-hand side variable. It’s calculated as:
4RSH j =−(RSH j,2006−RSH j,2000)
A larger decrease of the routine share in an MSA implies more routine workers were replaced
by technology, which further implies a larger increase of the automation degree. Thus the oppo-
site of the change in local routine share accordingly measure the advancement of “technological
realization".
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Employment Regression
This section shows the primary result of my empirical work. First, let’s take a look at the employ-
ment regression. The final equation in the 2SLS estimation is:
4L j = β0 +β14H j +β2RSH j + γX j +u j (3.8)
Instrument : Land j,Reg j,RSH∗j ,X j
The parameters of interest are β1 and β2, which represent the effect of housing boom demand
shock and the effect of RBTC. The performance of the first-stage regression is presented in Table
3.3 in Appendix section.
First I put the change in employment to population ratio from 2000-2006 at the left-hand side.
The result of the full model is presented in column (3) of Table 3.5. As we expect, the local housing
boom significantly increased the number of local job positions and raised the employment ratio.
The OLS estimate and 2SLS estimate of the effect of housing boom demand shock are basically the
same. One percentage log increase of the local housing price boost the total employment ratio by
0.0409 percent. In order to give a more intuitive and straightforward illustration of the coefficient
estimates, I compute the standardized effect of the housing boom and the RBTC. The standardized
effect of housing boom demand shock is defined as β̂1(4HP75−4HP25)/L̄2000, where β̂1 is the
2SLS estimate of the coefficient,4HP75 and4HP25 are the 75th percentile and 25th percentile of
the log change of HPI among all MSAs from 2000 to 2006, and L̄2000 is the mean initial base of the
labor market outcome in 2000. The standardized effect of the housing boom demand shock mea-
sure the percentage respond of the left-hand side labor market outcome variable in an “average"
MSA, if we hypothetically change its housing price increase from 25th percentile to 75th per-
centile. Similarly, the standardized effect of the RBTC is defined as β̂2(RSHP75−RSHP25)/L̄2000,
where RSHP75 is the 75th percentile of routine share among all MSAs in 2000.
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The standardized effects are presented in brackets in each regression table. They are presented
only when the underlying coefficient estimates are significant. As shown in Table 3.5, the stan-
dardized effect of housing boom is 0.0192. That is, in an average MSA, if the local housing boom
increased from 25th percentile to 75th percentile, then its increase in employment ratio would have
risen by 2.2%.
On the other hand, the 2SLS estimate of RBTC effect is insignificant. The technological change
didn’t harm the total employment opportunity during 2000-2006. This result fits the theory of
RBTC and is in accordance with Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2015). RBTC plays a more important
role in shaping the occupational composition structure of the labor market. It push the labor force
away from the routinized positions, toward the jobs with less routine intensity. The harm is off-
set by the gain, so the RBTC effect is not reflected in the overall employment statistic. On the
contrary, the sectoral demand shock, such as international trade and manufacturing decline, might
increase or reduce the overall labor demand through both direct (sector-targeted) effect and indi-
rect (multiplier) effect. The 2000-2006 housing boom I studied in this paper is also such a sectoral
shock.
Then I studied the impact of the housing boom and RBTC on the people with college education.
As shown in column (3) of panel (b), the housing boom significantly increase the employment ratio
among college population by standardized 1 percent in an average MSA. The effect of RBTC is
still insignificant.
As for the population without college education, the housing boom increase the employment
ratio by standardized 3 percent. The positive impact of housing boom on noncollege people is
larger than that on college people. The cyclical housing market prosperity creates more employ-
ment opportunities for the low-skill labor than for the high-skill labor.
Although the RBTC reduced the demand for certain routine occupations, it together with the
local housing boom might create the emerging demand for other non-routine occupations. People
sacked from the routine occupations might find that the employment opportunity in other non-
routine job positions was strong. The insignificant coefficient estimates of the routine share provide
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us with evidence to support this hypothesis. Next we will take a detailed look into the occupational
structure of the US labor market from 2000-2006.
The occupation group most directly facing the housing boom demand shock is the construction.
From Table 3.1 we can see that, compared with the overall occupations, construction occupations
contain far more manual tasks, and are substantially taken by people without college education.
The RTI index is much lower than the average level. Obviously, so far construction work is hard
to be completely automated, let alone to be outsourced. If a new building project is launched in a
local area, then a number of construction workers must be paid to work in that area. Thus we can
think of the construction occupation as a local non-routine job.
Table 3.6 presents the 2SLS estimation result for the employment share in construction. Among
the total population, the housing boom increased the employment share in construction by 8 per-
cent. Among noncollege people, the magnitude of the estimated effect is 8.2 percent. Slightly
larger.
However, we cannot see significant effect of RBTC on the construction jobs. Although we can
see a large point estimate of the RBTC effect on noncollege labor force to move to construction, the
standard error is also large. Therefore, although the net employment gain in construction due to the
housing boom was strong, the occupational structural shift from routine positions to construction
positions was weak and neglectable.
Well documented in the existing research, jobs like telephone operators, file clerks, word pro-
cessors and typists, assembly line workers, are the most exposed to routinization. These jobs fall
into the categories of office and administrative support, and production. In column (1) of Table
3.7, the coefficient estimates of housing boom demand shock and routine share are both strongly
significant. The local housing boom strongly increase the local employment share in office support
occupations by 2.5 percent. However, the RBTC also has strong effect in office jobs. The effect is
negative. The RBTC reduced the demand for these intensively routine jobs, hence decreasing the
employment share in office occupation by 2.3 percent.
The RBTC also had negative effect on production occupations. The employment share in
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production jobs declined by 6.9 percent due to the RBTC.
However, the regression result shows no significant effect of housing boom on these jobs. The
point estimate is small, come along with a standard error of similar magnitude. The reason might
be that the production workers usually produced tangible items, and they are highly tradable over
regions. Thus the production activity need not be held in flourishing local economy.
If we exclusively look at the population without college education, the magnitude of effect
on office workers is even larger. The housing boom increased the employment share in office
occupations by 5.9 percent. The employment gain was greatly reversed by the RBTC, which
reduced the employment share by 4.1 percent. As for the noncollege production workers, the
RBTC significantly reduced the employment share by 6.7 percent.
Although both office support occupations and production occupations contain considerable
routine tasks, the RBTC effect was stronger for production workers than for office workers. What’s
more, the housing boom basically had no positive impact on the employment of production work-
ers. Meanwhile, thanks to the housing boom, workers were filled into office administrative posi-
tions. The noncollege workers especially benefited from the housing boom, if they successfully
got employed in such office positions.
Table 3.8 presents the estimates on professors, professionals, and other occupations. Among
high-skill occupations, the category of professors contains relatively more routine tasks, while the
professional jobs contain relatively fewer routine tasks. The task content of both of them are very
abstract and non-manual. It shows no evidence that the RBTC caused any impact on these jobs.
In the perspective of employment gain, the RBTC theory predicts the impact of RBTC should be
concentrated on the between shift of low-skill labor (Autor and Dorn (2013)).
The housing boom has significant effect on the professionals, but no significant effect on the
professors. The housing boom during 2000-2006 boost the employment share in professional
occupation by 2.8 percent.
As for the other occupations, neither housing boom nor the RBTC has any effect on its employ-
ment share change. By the nature of these jobs, they are less exposed to the shock from housing
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market and technological change. For example, farming and extraction jobs are concentrated in
certain areas rich in natural resources. This is relatively irrelevant to the housing boom.
After I identify office and administrative support and production occupations as the main occu-
pations under routinization, the next question is where these workers were going to. If the housing
market was good in a city, then it might be because the people were getting richer, more native
people were getting jobs, or more immigrants were flowing in to compete for the job opportuni-
ties. All of these would call for an increasing demand for local service. By local service I mean
that the people hired in these positions offer some kind of service directly to the people living in
the local community. By nature their output should not be tradable to other far-away places. The
service occupations I define are in a very broad sense. I divide them into high-skill local service
group and low-skill local service group, by the college ratio of these occupations. Among the
low-skill service jobs, some of them are low-pay, low-skill jobs. But the high-skill service jobs are
intensively taken by people with college education. In fact, the high-skill local service occupations
are ranked #1 by the college ratio.
In Table 3.9, column (1), the coefficient estimate of housing shock and routine share on high-
skill local service occupations are both insignificant. On the other hand, the housing boom demand
shock and the RBTC both have significant effect on the change in employment share in low-skill
local service occupations. The local housing boom contributed to increase the employment share
in low-skill local service by 2 percent. The magnitude of the effect of the RBTC was even larger. If
a city is initially one percentage more intensive in routine tasks than another city, then during 2000-
2006 its increase in employment share in low-skill local service would be 0.1947 percent higher
than another city. In other words, approximately 19.5 percent of the labor force in routine positions
were shifted to the low-skill local service positions during 2000-2006. In sum, this increased the
employment share in low-skill service jobs by 3.3 percent. The gain was substantial.
Table 3.1 tells us that office support and production occupations are low-skill. That is, the
college ratio of these occupations are lower than the overall level. More accurately, we can consider
office and administrative support as middle-skill jobs, since the college ratio is just a little bit lower
86
than the overall level. These two groups are the most exposed to the RBTC. In fact, the national
aggregate employment share in these positions declined in a considerable amount. But these people
might find job opportunities in local service position. In fact, the employment gain in low-skill
service outpaced the employment loss in these two routinization exposed occupation groups. The
sum of the coefficient estimates of the routine share on office support occupations and production
occupations is -0.1671. The magnitude is smaller than the estimate on low-skill service, which is
0.1947.
If we focus on the people without college education, then the effect is even larger. Housing
boom demand shock increased the employment share in low-skill local service by 2.3 percent, and
4.6 percent of the employment share was dragged to these positions from routine intensive jobs,
due to the RBTC.
There are some potential explanations for why the effect is insignificant on high-skill service
occupations. First, so far we have not seen any negative effect estimates on high-skill labor 4
caused by the RBTC. In the theoretical model in Autor and Dorn (2013), the automation process is
complementary to high-skill workers. Most high-skill worker should benefit from the technological
change because it enhances their productivity and efficiency. If no college people were fired in
other jobs, then no college people would “shift" to high-skill service occupations. This is not the
case for low-skill service occupations since many noncollege workers in office and assembly line
lost their jobs.
Second, the speed of the increase in skill supply might be slower than the speed of the increase
in skill demand. Because the education requirement for working in high-skill local service is
high. A lot of education and training investment must be involved if a noncollege worker wants to
transit to high-skill service positions. What’s more, the subject specialization in high-skill jobs are
highly diversified. So it is also difficult for college workers to freely transit between occupations.
This might explain the insignificant effect of housing boom demand shock on high-skill service
occupations.
4The coefficient estimates of routine share on professor group and professional group are both insignificant. See
Table 3.8.
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3.4.2 Wage Regression
When we talk about labor market outcome, change in wage is as important as change in employ-
ment. The rich individual information in the census data enable us to examine the housing shock
effect and RBTC effect on individual wage change in a very detailed manner. In this section I build
a difference-in-difference type econometric model in the individual level. I pool the 2000 census
data and 2006 ACS data to implement the wage regression.
wi jkt = ρk[4RSH j ·1(t = 2006)]+ψXi +αt +δ j +φk + ei jkt (3.9)
where wi jkt is the log weekly labor income of individual i working in occupation k in MSA j
in year t. The change in routine share 4RSH j is the variable of interest. Time fixed effect αt
(t = 2000 or t = 2006), MSA fixed effect δ j, and occupation fixed effect φk are included in the
regression. Xi are a rich set of individual characteristics which serve as control variables. This
difference-in-difference type model provides us with clear identification of how the variation of
the technological change creates variation of change in wages of each occupations. Our main goal
is to estimate ρk.
The result of the wage regression complements the employment regression and supports the
RBTC theory. From the employment regression, there are no significant effect of the RBTC on the
employment change of construction and others occupations. The effects of the RBTC on wages
are also insignificant for these two occupations.
On the other hand, the RBTC theory predicts that the technological change is complementary
to the high-skill labor. In Table 3.10, the coefficients estimates are significant for all three high-
skill occupation groups: high-skill local service, professor, and professional. If an MSA had larger
decrease in employment share in routine tasks from 2000 to 2006, which implied that the routine
workers are more heavily replaced by technology, then the wages of these high-skill workers would
experience higher wage increase. Although the RBTC didn’t affect the employment of high-skill
occupations, it did boost the productivity of the high-skill workers, hence raising their wages.
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Every coin has two sides. The RBTC did harm somebody’s welfare, especially the low-skill
workers. The coefficients estimates are negative for low-skill local service, office administrative
support, and production occupations. Due to the declining demand for hiring people to perform
routine tasks, the RBTC significantly reduced the routine workers’ wages. Specifically, the produc-
tion workers experienced larger negative shock than the office workers. The coefficient estimate for
office occupations is -0.9897, while the coefficient estimate for production occupations is -1.4439.
Not surprisingly, the RBTC also lowered the wage payment to low-skill workers. From the
RBTC theory and the employment regression we know that the majority of those who sacked from
routine jobs finally flowed to low-skill service jobs. Therefore, if an MSA had larger decrease in
employment share in routine positions, then it implied that more workers would transit from these
routine occupations to low-skill local service sector. That is, the supply of low-skill local service
workers would increase. It would shrink the wages of this occupation group.
3.5 Conclusion
Stepping into the 21st century, the process of Routine Biased Technological Change and job po-
larization continued. The RBTC had ongoing impact on the employment structure and the oc-
cupational composition of the U.S. labor market. The impact was more significant for the the
noncollege labor force. The main routine intensive occupation groups, office administrative sup-
port, and production, were largely exposed to the shock of RBTC. The national employment share
in these low-skill routine jobs consistently dropped. Even the 2000-2006 housing boom did not
boost the employment in production. Noncollege workers were shifted from office and production
positions, to low-skill local service positions. The employment gain in low-skill local service from
the housing boom and the RBTC was tremendous.
On the other hand, the impact of the RBTC on the college-educated labor force was moderate
during 2000-2006. The local routine share had no significant effects on the employment shift
between any high-skill occupation groups.
However, because the RBTC improved the productivity of high-skill labor, they gained from the
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technological advancement in terms of paychecks. The RBTC significantly increased the wages of
professionals, professors, and high-skill local service workers. Relatively speaking, the low-skill
workers might be less lucky. The process of RBTC lowered the wages of the workers in routine
occupations, as well as those who worked in low-skill local service jobs. Technology replaced
the routine workers hence reducing the demand for routine jobs. The increasing supply inflow of
workers to the service sector was to blame for the declining wages in this sector.
The evolution of the U.S. labor employment structure and occupational composition will pro-
ceed. There might be some other stories during the Great Recession and in recent years. This will
be left to my further research.
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Figure 3.1: Quarterly Housing Price Index 1990-2017
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Figure 3.2: Routine Share and Routine Share Instrument
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Figure 3.3: Employment Share of Construction Occupation 2000-2011
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Figure 3.4: Employment Share of Occupations 2000-2011
94
Figure 3.5: Employment Share of Service Occupation 2000-2011
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Table 3.1: Task Measures of Occupations
Occupation Routine Abstract Manual RTI College ratio Wage
all 4.37 3.02 1.34 -0.11 0.51 18.99
high-skill local service 3.96 4.36 1.10 -0.38 0.87 21.71
community and social service 1.39 4.42 0.23
education, training, and library 1.53 7.32 0.26
healthcare practitioners 5.15 4.33 1.15
STEM 5.67 6.28 1.09 -0.37 0.86 24.82
architecture and engineering 6.39 7.11 1.44
life, physical, and social science 4.99 5.49 0.75
computer and math 3.59 6.00 0.96
professional 2.75 5.61 0.71 -0.29 0.77 27.04
management 1.89 6.68 0.48
business operation 2.32 5.68 0.48
financial specialist 3.56 6.15 0.15
legal 2.54 3.15 0.08
art, entertainment, sport, media 3.31 3.69 1.50
office and administrative support 5.01 1.78 0.19 1.04 0.47 14.00
others 4.86 1.79 2.30 -0.49 0.37 16.71
protective 1.54 1.49 2.97
farming, fishing, and forestry 2.77 1.17 2.78
installation, maintenance, and repair 6.87 2.15 1.81
extraction 4.90 1.19 2.75
low-skill local service 1.93 2.77 1.79 -0.28 0.35 15.07
healthcare support 3.75 1.59 1.79
food preparation and serving 2.52 0.97 1.19
cleaning and maintenance 3.19 1.61 2.25
personal care and service 2.94 1.99 1.26
retail sales 2.34 3.14 0.35
transportation 2.74 1.67 3.21
production 6.06 1.37 1.07 0.27 0.24 14.86
construction 6.44 1.70 2.94 -0.37 0.23 16.23
Note: The titles of occupation subgroups (not in bold face) are from 1-digit level occupations defined in 2000 census and 2005 ACS. The college ratios and mean wages of workers in each
occupations are calculated using 2000 census data. Each individual is weighted by census personal weight and labor supply weight respectively when calculating college ratio and mean wage.
The source of occupational task measures are from DOT and O*NET database.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of MSA-level Variables
Variable min median max mean stand.dev
Change of HPI 2000-2006 0.086 0.339 0.972 0.427 0.227
Routine share in 2000 0.192 0.292 0.375 0.289 0.024
Land unavailability index -0.024 -0.351 2.824 -1.206 1.012
Local regulation index -1.677 -0.078 2.179 -0.054 0.772
Routine share instrument 0.245 0.287 0.363 0.288 0.016
Change in employment ratio 2000-2006
All -0.094 -0.005 0.090 -0.003 0.027
College -0.082 -0.014 0.071 -0.013 0.023
Noncollege -0.111 -0.004 0.109 -0.002 0.036
Change in employment share 2000-2006:
Construction -0.016 0.004 0.052 0.004 0.009
Office -0.041 -0.007 0.022 -0.007 0.010
Production -0.071 -0.009 0.025 -0.009 0.010
Professor -0.011 -0.001 0.012 -0.001 0.004
Professional -0.028 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.010
Others -0.039 -0.003 0.064 -0.002 0.011
High-skill local service -0.026 0.001 0.041 0.002 0.009
Low-skill local service -0.054 0.009 0.062 0.009 0.017
97
Table 3.3: First-stage Regression
Housing shock Routine share
(1) (2)
Land unavailability 0.0970∗∗∗∗ -0.0011
(0.0264) (0.0007)
Local regulation 0.1422∗∗∗∗ -0.0007
(0.0366) (0.0016)
RSH∗i 1.1945 1.2593
∗∗∗∗
(1.4558) (0.0865)
F-statistic 46.92 76.7
R2 0.57 0.69
N 234 234
All regressions include all control variables and are weighted by MSA population in 2000. Standard errors are
clustered at state level. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01, **** 0.001)
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Table 3.4: Employment Regression: OLS Estimates
OLS
All
Dependent variable: High-skill sevice Low-skill service Office support Production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Housing shock -0.0011 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗∗ 0.0039
(0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0028)
Routine share 0.0505∗∗∗ 0.1928∗∗∗∗ −0.0421∗∗ −0.0770∗∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0411) (0.0211) (0.0184)
R2 0.02 0.38 0.29 0.18
N 282 282 282 282
OLS
All
Dependent variable: Construction Professor Professional Others
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Housing shock 0.0104∗∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗∗ 0.0024
(0.0031) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Routine share -0.0066 0.0043 -0.0125 -0.0159
(0.0209) (0.0084) (0.0351) (0.0154)
R2 0.30 0.07 0.17 0.03
N 282 282 282 282
In all columns, these control variables are included: college share of total population in 2000, female share of
employed population in 2000, and the share of white people to total population in 2000. All regressions are
weighted by MSA population in 2000. Standard errors clustered at state level are in parentheses. The mean
effects are in brackets. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01, **** 0.001)
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Table 3.5: The Effects of Housing Boom and RBTC on Employment to Population Ratio: OLS
and 2SLS Estimates
panel (a): Dependent variable: Employment to population ratio
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Housing shock 0.0662∗∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗∗
(0.0097) (0.0082)
Routine share 0.1254 -0.0322
(0.1362) (0.0846)
R2 0.43 0.01 0.66
N 282 283 234
panel (b): Dependent variable: College employment ratio
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Housing shock 0.0357∗∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0063)
Routine share 0.0771 -0.0063
(0.0764) (0.0694)
R2 0.29 0.005 0.40
N 282 283 234
panel (c): Dependent variable: Noncollege employment ratio
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Housing shock 0.0926∗∗∗∗ 0.0568∗∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0130)
Routine share 0.1702 -0.0222
(0.1732) (0.1080)
R2 0.44 0.006 0.66
N 282 283 234
In column (3), these control variables are included: college share of total population in 2000, female share of employed population in 2000, and the share of white people to total population in
2000. All regressions are weighted by MSA population in 2000. Standard errors clustered at state level are in parentheses. The standardized effects are in brackets. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01,
**** 0.001)
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Table 3.6: The Effects of Housing Boom and Routine Share on Employment Share in Construction:
2SLS Estimates
2SLS
All Noncollege
Dependent variable: Construction Construction
(1) (2)
Housing shock 0.0093∗∗ 0.0133∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0063)
[0.0798] [0.0823]
Routine share -0.0337 -0.0245
(0.0242) (0.0368)
R2 0.34 0.33
N 234 234
In all columns, these control variables are included: college share of total population in 2000, female share
of employed population in 2000, and the share of white people to total population in 2000. All regressions are
weighted by MSA population in 2000. Standard errors clustered at state level are in parentheses. The standardized
effects are in brackets. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01, **** 0.001)
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Table 3.7: The Effects of Housing Boom and RBTC on Employment Share in Low-skill Routine
Occupations: 2SLS Estimates
2SLS
All Noncollege
Dependent variable: Office support Production Office support Production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Housing shock 0.0081∗∗∗∗ -0.0001 0.0184∗∗∗∗ -0.0007
(0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0055)
[0.0248] [0.0587]
Routine share −0.0669∗∗ −0.1002∗∗∗∗ −0.1152∗∗ −0.1294∗∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0191) (0.0584) (0.0327)
[-0.0230] [-0.0686] [-0.0409] [-0.0667]
R2 0.32 0.16 0.28 0.07
N 234 234 234 234
In all columns, these control variables are included: college share of total population in 2000, female share
of employed population in 2000, and the share of white people to total population in 2000. All regressions are
weighted by MSA population in 2000. Standard errors clustered at state level are in parentheses. The standardized
effects are in brackets. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01, **** 0.001)
102
Table 3.8: The Effects of Housing Boom and RBTC on Employment Share in STEM, Professional,
and Others: 2SLS Estimates
2SLS
All
Dependent variable: STEM Professional Others
(1) (2) (3)
Housing shock 0.0029∗ 0.0101∗∗∗∗ 0.0015
(0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0028)
[0.0461] [0.0282]
Routine share -0.0042 -0.0075 -0.0261
(0.0093) (0.0441) (0.0246)
R2 0.08 0.18 0.04
N 234 234 234
In all columns, these control variables are included: college share of total population in 2000, female share
of employed population in 2000, and the share of white people to total population in 2000. All regressions are
weighted by MSA population in 2000. Standard errors clustered at state level are in parentheses. The standardized
effects are in brackets. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01, **** 0.001)
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Table 3.9: The Effects of Housing Boom and RBTC on Employment Share in Local Servce Occu-
pation: 2SLS Estimates
2SLS
All Noncollege
Dependent variable: High-skill service Low-skill service Low-skill service
(1) (2) (3)
Housing shock -0.0004 0.0128∗∗ 0.0172∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0058) (0.0085)
[0.0196] [0.0225]
Routine share 0.0336 0.1947∗∗∗ 0.3128∗∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0619) (0.0875)
[0.0334] [0.0457]
R2 0.04 0.43 0.49
N 234 234 234
In all columns, these control variables are included: college share of total population in 2000, female share
of employed population in 2000, and the share of white people to total population in 2000. All regressions are
weighted by MSA population in 2000. Standard errors clustered at state level are in parentheses. The standardized
effects are in brackets. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01, **** 0.001)
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Table 3.10: Wage Regression: Pooled OLS Estimates
Wage Regression
Coefficient ρk High-skill sevice Low-skill service Office support Production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Routine share 1.3590∗∗∗∗ −1.6900∗∗∗∗ −0.9897∗∗∗∗ −1.4439∗∗∗∗
(0.2568) (0.2366) (0.2297) (0.2520)
Coefficient ρk Construction STEM Professional Others
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Routine share −0.3113 2.4775∗∗∗∗ 2.1198∗∗∗∗ −0.4155
(0.3431) (0.4804) (0.3256) (0.2642)
The sample include all 2000 census and 2006 ACS individuals who were aged between 16 and 64, lived in
metropolitan areas, were not in military, were employed, and gained positive wage income. N = 4946607, R2 =
0.34. Housing shock and routine share are instrumented by their respective instruments. Time fixed effect,
MSA fixed effect, occupation fixed effect are controlled. Individual level control variables include: race dummy,
female dummy, citizen status dummy, education dummy, marital status dummy, English speaking fluency dummy,
working disability dummy, foreign born dummy, potential experience, and potential experience squared. The
regression is weighted by individual labor supply weight. Standard errors are clustered at MSAs and are presented
in parentheses. The standardized effects are in the brackets. (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01, **** 0.001)
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